Canadian Orwellian world: Lockdowns, vaccines passports and more

He will hear this all over the world where people are aware what he has done.

These matters will haunt him to the end of his days and beyond.

The following was about his dad from 6-years ago: out of the mouths of babes (gotta love em:-)) and they should ask more questions of him ('Mr. Prime Minister, I'm just 6 and my friends and I are being told by you that we need covid mRNA vaccination when science tells us that we are not even at risk of covid and the shots have associated high dangers, why? and oh, one more question, do you force your own children to wear masks as we did for two years? and why would your do that to your children when masks are known to be dangerous?') . Of course, Justin then moved away form the core question/issue asked, and goes on about not everyone will agree, as leaders must make tyrannical hard decisions.

 
Yep, he will! And when he hops on the ship with the other saviors, he should wear his favorite disguises so he can blend in perfectly!
18720806-7486131-image-a-13_1568986522220.jpg
 
These matters will haunt him to the end of his days and beyond.

The following was about his dad from 6-years ago: out of the mouths of babes (gotta love em:-)) and they should ask more questions of him ('Mr. Prime Minister, I'm just 6 and my friends and I are being told by you that we need covid mRNA vaccination when science tells us that we are not even at risk of covid and the shots have associated high dangers, why? and oh, one more question, do you force your own children to wear masks as we did for two years? and why would your do that to your children when masks are known to be dangerous?') . Of course, Justin then moved away form the core question/issue asked, and goes on about not everyone will agree, as leaders must make tyrannical hard decisions.


Wonderful child, with :lol: verbalizing a fantastic simple observation

But that rambling Turd™ (bla-bla-bla) for 1.5 minutes kind of shows, how little he actually answers to the children. Wait, maybe i am not expressing myself correctly: for being young children, he could have been more interactive (and shorter) towards/with the children and their questions, rather then babbling and rambling around for 'ewwa and ewwa'... I mean which child can actually take in his 1.5 minute speech-answer like he gave ? It felt more like The Turd ™ was mainly justifying himself and towards those who record him with cameras, rather then answering and interacting directly with the children and their questions...
 
Strange days in Canada indeed like here in FR. With the needed papers and the limited access time in 2021, and 2020.
Each and every day in the states and in Europe was and will be a challenge by doing a 180 to their narrative.


The 15 minute city is getting a lot of talk on alternative press here in Canada. It may be possible in downtown Toronto or Ottawa. Nowhere else will this work.

My kid and his friends who have lived in downtown Vancouver for a decade won't go downtown anymore and have migrated to Burnaby. I moved to Vancouver in 1987 and Gastown/East Hastings had a half block of addicts. It's now multiple blocks and a hell zone on East Hastings leaking over into Chinatown. Canadian cities can't be controlled anymore. All the downtown's are a huge mess of homelessness and addiction. Add to the fact that infrastructure hasn't been upgraded since the 1990's.

I think that the resistance in Canada is very underestimated by the Globalists and our dear leader of the Drama Teacher world... :-)
 
September 1, 2022

Q: (Toronto group) Canada is still punishing the unvaxxed with unemployment, travel bans, even denying medical transplants. Why is Canada the outlier compared to the other countries, and will this end soon?

A: It will end when Canadians say so.

Q: (L) Well, why is Canada doing this?

A: Experiment on "tough" people.

Q: (L) So they're trying to see how far they can push people who are reputed to be tough and not pushable.

 
There’s been several “snippets” on the local news this past week regarding the on and off closures of various hospitals emergency departments and clinics throughout the province of British Columbia due to extreme staff shortages.

The mayor of Merritt, Mike Goetz, is going up against the public “Health Overlord“ Adrian Dix, regarding the unvaccinated staff still being refused employment based on their personal choices.
The zoom video, imbedded in the article, of Dix responding is very interesting, the micro expressions that flash across his face are a combination of rage, arrogance and disgust.
Also, there seems to be shades of fear flashing once or twice.
I’d be interested to hear if anyone else can pick up on that.

From the article:
“He says if the province lifted the COVID-19 vaccine mandate, it would allow more healthcare workers to fill the current void.

“You’ve got to look at anything that’s going to help,” Goetz told CFJC Today. “Any idea that’s on the table really should’ve be too crazy. We’re into year three of this now. Most of us have learned how to live with this disease. A lot of us have had it. I’ve had it.”[…]

“After the mandate was implemented, 895 healthcare workers within Interior Health lost their jobs (66 at RIH and 173 at Kelowna General Hospital).

Goetz, who admitted he’s vaccinated, is trying to push the idea ahead with the B.C. Rural Health Care Alliance.
“The idea of an unvaccinated nurse or doctor treating me wouldn’t affect me at all,” he said. “When you get groceries at the store or you get served by a server at a restaurant, do you know whether they’re vaccinated or not?”
 
The zoom video, imbedded in the article, of Dix responding is very interesting, the micro expressions that flash across his face are a combination of rage, arrogance and disgust.
Also, there seems to be shades of fear flashing once or twice.
I’d be interested to hear if anyone else can pick up on that.
Dix is one of the biggest idiots on the planet. So what do you get when you have idiots in positions of power..?

I can't stand listening to him. He will stick with his idiotic ideology until death.

I do wonder, even if they lift the mandate, how many will come back to work, knowing just how f**ked up the medical industry is in the province, with all the same idiots still in charge. Don't know how eager they will be getting back into it, knowing nothing has really changed.
 
Dix is one of the biggest...

Yes, Glenn, however there is a line up.

Speaking of the lineup, and it gets worse, Deena Hinshaw simply jumped the queue and now backs up Dr. Bonnie Henry in BC.


During the United Conservative Party leadership race last summer, Alberta Premier Danielle Smith campaigned on firing Hinshaw, who was responsible for the province’s Covid-19 response, and made good on that promise shortly after becoming premier.
[...]
Hinshaw also faced backlash across the province after it was revealed she received a nearly $228,000 Covid bonus in 2021, on top of her $363,633.92 salary. That marked the largest cash benefit payout of any provincial civil servant.

My coffee almost came out my nose after choking upon learning of this.

From Macbeth (Act IV, Scene 1):

1 WITCH. Round about the caldron go;
In the poison'd entrails throw.—
Toad, that under cold stone,
Days and nights has thirty-one;
Swelter'd venom sleeping got,
Boil thou first i' the charmed pot!
ALL. Double, double toil and trouble;
Fire burn, and caldron bubble
.
2 WITCH. Fillet of a fenny snake,
In the caldron boil and bake;
Eye of newt, and toe of frog,
Wool of bat, and tongue of dog,
Adder's fork, and blind-worm's sting,
Lizard's leg, and owlet's wing,—
For a charm of powerful trouble,
Like a hell-broth boil and bubble.
 
There’s been several “snippets” on the local news this past week regarding the on and off closures of various hospitals emergency departments and clinics throughout the province of British Columbia due to extreme staff shortages.

The mayor of Merritt, Mike Goetz, is going up against the public “Health Overlord“ Adrian Dix, regarding the unvaccinated staff still being refused employment based on their personal choices.
The zoom video, imbedded in the article, of Dix responding is very interesting, the micro expressions that flash across his face are a combination of rage, arrogance and disgust.
Also, there seems to be shades of fear flashing once or twice.
I’d be interested to hear if anyone else can pick up on that.

From the article:
“He says if the province lifted the COVID-19 vaccine mandate, it would allow more healthcare workers to fill the current void.

“You’ve got to look at anything that’s going to help,” Goetz told CFJC Today. “Any idea that’s on the table really should’ve be too crazy. We’re into year three of this now. Most of us have learned how to live with this disease. A lot of us have had it. I’ve had it.”[…]

“After the mandate was implemented, 895 healthcare workers within Interior Health lost their jobs (66 at RIH and 173 at Kelowna General Hospital).

Goetz, who admitted he’s vaccinated, is trying to push the idea ahead with the B.C. Rural Health Care Alliance.
“The idea of an unvaccinated nurse or doctor treating me wouldn’t affect me at all,” he said. “When you get groceries at the store or you get served by a server at a restaurant, do you know whether they’re vaccinated or not?”
dix has to go sooner than later - toxic entity

 
dix has to go sooner than later - toxic entity


Arrogantly silent.

CTV is late to the party, and it is far worse than all that.

Insiders also expressed frustration that health authority chiefs and other experts in the public health system who are ready and willing to address a variety of issues have been nearly absent from the public eye, despite requests from journalists for interviews, as messaging and control of the situation has been centralized with the minister and provincial health officer Dr. Bonnie Henry.

It’s noteworthy that a government-ordered “COVID-19 Lessons Learned Review” cited government stakeholders as complaining that “there was strict central control of the messaging, including actively discouraging any questioning or challenging of the PHO.”

Think this whole thread has been a testament as to their centralization and hammer in BC.

With the link above, had not read the "Covid-19 Lessons Learned Review," so adding the opening letter and any points of interest (much is not added so perhaps save a copy for a rainy day if interested). Pardon for the blue text as its been a tough out of reality experience these last couple of years for all.

There is no doubt that this will shape the next round:

September 23, 2022
Honourable Mike Farnworth Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General
PO BOX 9041 STN PROV GOVT Victoria B.C. V8W 9E1
Via email Dear Minister, We are pleased to provide the Final Report of the COVID-19 Lessons Learned Review. As set out in the Terms of Reference for the review {oh yes, must have a TR}, we have conducted an operational review of the Government of British Columbia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In doing so, we have engaged extensively with the public {:knitting:}, the B.C. government and broader public sector, First Nations and Indigenous organizations {who were well ponerized}, and government stakeholders. We have conducted research into best practices in public health emergency response and emergency management. We have also created a timeline of events and compared outcomes for British Columbia with select Canadian provinces. Based on lessons learned from things that went well and areas that could be improved, we have developed 26 findings and conclusions, intended to help the B.C. government be better prepared for future provincewide emergencies. Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to improving this crucial government function.
Sincerely,
Bob de Faye
Dan Perrin
Chris Trumpy
Pc: Lori Wanamaker, Deputy Minister to the Premier

{Note: "Trumpy and de Faye are former deputy ministers, while Perrin also worked in the public service before founding Perrin, Thorau and Associates Ltd. in 1994}

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Overall, despite being unprepared for a province-wide emergency the Government of British Columbia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic was strong, showing resilience, balance, and nimbleness that should give British Columbians confidence in its ability to respond to future province-wide emergencies {:cheer:}

This report is a 150 pages so will skip through ending down to the findings:

What we found In the report, we make 26 findings and conclusions in six categories: trust, preparation, decision-making, communication, implementation, and impacts of the pandemic response on Indigenous Peoples. The conclusions point to the areas where improvements can help prepare for the next province-wide emergency.
[...]
Public trust Our first finding addresses the overarching question of public trust. B.C. had a strong overall response to the pandemic, and the public trust built by the calm and competent daily press conferences led by the Provincial Health Officer contributed significantly to that success {with 24/7 case numbers to wind every one up}. Public support for the provincial government response has been relatively strong in B.C. throughout, but, as in other provinces, it has fallen over time. Division stoked by vaccine mandates has demonstrated that a significant minority are strongly resistant to restrictive public health measures {can't have that, which will be addressed (passports, bills on professionals, big corporate followers - may be social credit - in 2.0}. It is important that ways be found to rebuild trust {meaning it was broken}, which will be necessary to support compliance {that is the big word, compliance} with future restrictive measures should they be needed.
[...]
Communications Mostly government communications were unambiguous, clear, culturally appropriate {very important virtue}, and timely, which are key elements of the standard we expected of communications. But communications could have been improved. We make four findings related to communications.
[...{thought to add this} Indigenous impacts The distinct history, culture, circumstances, needs, impacts, and implications of the pandemic on B.C.’s Indigenous Peoples made clear the need to present their story as a whole in a separate part. The First Nations Health Authority (FNHA) has indicated that First Nations people in B.C. have tested positive for COVID-19 at higher rates, have had higher rates of hospital admissions at lower ages, and have had higher rates of death from COVID-19. Many of the factors that make Indigenous communities more likely to be severely affected by COVID-19 have their roots in the past 200 years of colonialism and its impacts on the social determinants of health. Our objective for engagement was to provide Indigenous Peoples, Treaty Nations, First Nations, and Indigenous-governed organizations with opportunities to share their experiences while respecting the pressures placed on them by the pandemic and consultation demands. More than 600 individuals who selfidentified as Indigenous responded to our public opinion research survey, providing extensive comments, and all 204 First Nations were invited to provide input through a separate public opinion research survey. We also had several meetings with FNHA senior staff and spoke to several First Nations leadership groups. We held sessions with and received thoughtful written submissions from some Treaty Nations and Métis Nation British Columbia. The B.C. Association of Aboriginal Friendship Centres provided important insights on the impacts felt by B.C.’s urban Indigenous population {noted here is the Federal government, at lest for reserves, massively inculcated the reserves with covid reminders on every wall, with medical staff around every corner to help deliver vaccines - including to the young as age peramaters were adjusted. Many (as observed) became seriously ill, and as the report points out, "had higher rates of death."}

The response to the pandemic highlighted the complex web of federal, provincial, and First Nations jurisdictions, which created gaps, overlaps, inconsistencies, and inequities. In particular, urban Indigenous populations were less well served. FNHA played the key role during the pandemic of coordinating among the governments, and Emergency Management BC also was involved in coordinating the pandemic response with First Nations.

The Terms:
Terms of reference On March 16, 2022, Honourable Mike Farnworth {needs to be added to @Glenn's most despised list - and he "announced" the 'appointments' of this review}, Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General, announced the appointment of an independent project team made up of the three of us—Bob de Faye, Dan Perrin, and Chris Trumpy—to conduct a review of the British Columbia public sector’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The full terms of reference of the review are attached as Appendix A. The objective of this review is to learn from the COVID-19 experience and to apply those learnings to be better prepared for the province-wide emergency. To do so, we have been asked to conduct an operational review of government’s response. The document specifically excludesan assessment of economic recovery and public policy decisions made by government to deal with the consequences of the pandemic and decisions made by the independent Provincial Health Officerfrom the scope of the review. That exclusion received a certain amount of criticism when the review was announced. Not reviewing the decisions themselves allowed our team and those we spoke with to focus on operational matters—how the large machine of government was able to adjust and respond {"operational matters" indeed. Who needs an economy}. Nevertheless, criticism the mandate received may in itself have reduced the number of organizations willing to engage with us {thus no more criticism allowed in the future}. The reason why the decisions themselves were excluded from the scope was because the next event will differ substantially from this pandemic, and the specific decisions made then will be informed by the circumstances at the time. Our mandate is to consider how the public policy decisions were made, communicated, and implemented. We also examine how government operations were adjusted in response to the pandemic. Those topics are covered in this report.

{see Appendix A - it can't be copied and pasted}

Government 101 BC government’s pandemic response is a continuing all-of-government response that is extremely complex, involving almost all of the broad public sector and utilizing almost all of the mechanisms that government has at its disposal to deliver services and affect society. Our task is to undertake an operational review of this immense entity, with over 30,000 public service employees and about 500,000 public sector employees. As context to our review, the following provides an overview of what government does, how it is organized, and how it works, which we refer to as “Government 101.” {one thing noticed in the press during "the operation," was the focus on the 30,000, however not a focus on the additional 500,000, and then add the service providers (private) who were all mandated, that is over a million people under their direct vaccine mandate control - many in the private sector and pretty much all unions would follow suite}
[...]
The types of public health tools used in response to a pandemic respiratory illness like the current pandemic focus on managing the likelihood of transmission of infection. They include both measures implemented by individuals changing their behaviour and measures taken by public health authorities. Not all of the tools listed were used in B.C. during the pandemic. The list is presented in no particular order:
• hand washing and covering coughs and sneezes {common sense}
• use of facemasks {which originally the PHO dismissed, and then doubled down}
• cleaning and disinfection
• physical screens and barriers {more items to clean}
• enhanced ventilation
• physical distancing
• reduced contacts
• identification of essential services {liquor and cannabis stores where important, play grounds, no, not at all}
• gathering limits, event cancellations, and facility closures {societal closure}
• capacity limits
• testing for infection management and surveillance purposes {PCR :rolleyes:}
• isolation when ill, whether self-isolation or ordered quarantine
• case and contact management {PCR :rolleyes:and scary graphs}
lockdowns, stay-at-home orders, curfews, and travel restrictions, including border closures
• therapeutic medications and treatments {many specialists were closed (locked down), and important or life saving treatments deferred}
vaccinations {🥁they had such fun doing this to people, ruining their lives, their families and friends; very profitable coup de grace}
• requirements for workers to be vaccinated
• limits on activities for those not vaccinated (vaccine card or passport) {another coup de grace}
All except vaccines and medications are referred to as non-pharmaceutical interventions and are typically intended to create stronger, but not fail-safe, layered protection. Several of these approaches were used concurrently in B.C. during the COVID-19 pandemic.
[...]
Alternatively, the Provincial Health Officer can, by legal order, require people and businesses to comply with restrictions, including not allowing some business to open, requiring others to reduce capacity, imposing mask mandates in certain public places, setting up contact tracing, and requiring people who have the virus or have been exposed to quarantine, and so on.
How are decisions made about what measures to take and the specific design details of the measure? In general, the intention is to impose the fewest restrictions necessary at any given time for the shortest period of time. A key principle underlying public health is doing the least harm overall, including considering the harm caused by the disease together with the economic and the social effects of restricting activities {note again, the terms of reference do not address the socioeconomic}
Science informs public health decisions but does not dictate the decisions. It may be useful to briefly discuss what science is and is not. Some perceive science to be a set of immutable facts that explain what we know of the world and beyond. In fact, science is a process (the scientific method) that provides a rigorous approach to continuously learning. Science generates knowledge that can be used in practice to guide areas like health care, but very little in science is absolute or fully determined. As new knowledge is developed and tested, it creates new questions, often about ideas that many have taken for granted. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, since the SARS-COV-2 virus had not previously been seen in humans, very little was known about it. Over the past two years, scientific knowledge about the virus and its variants has multiplied at a tremendous rate and will continue to grow. And, as a result, the best practices based on today’s knowledge may change quickly and significantly as knowledge grows and, of course, as the virus evolves. Further, science cannot drive public policy decisions alone. Scientific evidence is very helpful in assessing the risks and harms associated with a disease and the effectiveness of the available public health measures. But other important considerations, like social and economic implications of public health measures {which they ae not suppose to mention as per the TR}, as well as their health effects for different groups within the population, all bear on the choice of measures put in place at a given time. In B.C., the COVID-19 Ethical Decision-Making Framework describes the process and considerations for making public health emergency response decision-making {yes, ethics, cannot forget that - Oops}.
Circumstances constantly change during a pandemic. Scientific knowledge about the disease changes, sometimes very quickly, requiring guidance and orders to change. The disease itself changes as it evolves and as waves come and go. Treatments and vaccines affect the level of risk {so they say, yet mRNA risky would be an understatment} People’s behaviours and reactions to public health measures change. All these things affect what public health tools are used and the details of their design and implementation. Inevitably, public health emergency response decisions are complex, high-stakes judgment calls informed by available information {suppressed or otherwise}, which will change as circumstances change. Some of these decisions must be taken quickly and with incomplete information, even when the public demands certainty and consistency to help allay their fears.
There are 3 pages of "pandemic timeline events" (from "January 2020 to May 2022") with graphs, statistically messaged or otherwise.

This is all about the vaccines:
The vaccine campaign: January 2021 to July 2021 In the third phase of the pandemic response, there was only one significant change to the government response approach, which was rolling out vaccinations and encouraging {encouragement later became a tyrannical matter} as many of those eligible for vaccination as possible to be vaccinated. Other than the vaccine rollout, the approach to the response continued in the same vein as in the previous phase. It continued to use increasingly targeted public health measures, maintained health-care system capacity, and focused on maintaining service delivery and providing support to those affected by the pandemic.
At the start of the pandemic, many experts suggested that a vaccine for the SARS-COV-2 virus was likely possible, but estimates of how long it would take to develop, test for safety and efficacy, and gain regulatory approval varied from at least one year to possibly much longer {er, like 15-years perhaps?} Traditionally, new vaccines have taken years to be approved. By using new mRNA technology, the first COVID-19 vaccine was approved for use in Canada on December 9, 2020, just eight months after the pandemic was declared {🎯} and the first doses of the vaccine arrived in B.C. a week later.
A new agency, Immunize B.C., was created in January 2021 to manage the vaccination campaign. The vaccine rollout utilizes a rapidly developed information technology system. The functionality of that system will be used to manage immunization on an ongoing basis, something that was missing from the health-care system before the pandemic {what was in place was free will}. By early May 2021, over 40 percent of those eligible had received one dose, which increased to over 65 percent two weeks later {yes, recall the propagandization at that time - mass fear porn} After some initial delays due to vaccine supply, the rollout has gone smoothly since it started, although uptake has fallen off as subsequent doses have been offered and younger age groups have been included. While government was responding to the pandemic, three additional significant emergency events occurred: during this phase of the pandemic response: the heat dome in late June 2021, a wildfire emergency with serious urban interface fires in late July 2021, and the atmospheric river event in November 2021. Some suggest that the atmospheric river event, and in particular the supply chain and recovery efforts to reopen major highways, benefited from the government’s pandemic response experience. The pandemic experience prepared government to react in a more nimble and timely way to the atmospheric river disruptions. But after 12 to 18 months of managing the COVID-19 response, these additional emergencies put significant additional pressure on the provincial government {perhaps the gods were not happy}.

Vaccine mandates: August 2021 to March 2022 Another significant change in the pandemic response occurred in September 2021, as vaccination rates in B.C. and across Canada approached 80 percent of those eligible being fully in vaccinated. Requirements to show proof of vaccination for some activities, known as vaccine cards or vaccine passports, began to be debated during the summer. Quebec was the first province to announce that vaccine cards would be required for many activities, such as attending events, eating in restaurants, and going to the gym. Although B.C. initially suggested it would not follow suit, within three weeks vaccine cards were announced for B.C. and protests against requiring a vaccine card to access services quickly began. A federal requirement to be vaccinated in order to travel by air or other federally regulated transport took effect in late October 2021. Vaccine mandates for workers were another mandatory restriction that began to be announced in July 2021, requiring workers to be vaccinated in order to work or to keep their employment. The mandates were imposed in different ways for different groups or workers. For example, vaccine mandates were imposed by the PHO for health-care facility staff, by the B.C. government for public service employees, and by different public and private sector organizations for their employees, with the details varying depending on the employer. Protests against restrictive public health measures were a feature of the pandemic that began with the first enforceable public health orders. However, the protests really gained momentum and started to receive considerable media attention in B.C. with the confluence of an enforceable mask mandate, vaccine mandates for workers, and vaccine cards all being introduced in August and September 2021. Protests in fall 2021 occurred at health-care facilities, disrupting workers and patients, so bubble zone legislation was enacted in November 2021. The self-named Freedom Convoy {:hug2:} movement grew through fall 2021, resulting in a weekslong occupation and disruption of downtown Ottawa starting January 2022, and continued with significant protests in Victoria’s Legislative Precinct in March 2022. When it seemed that the Delta wave was slowing down in December 2021, a public health order relaxed restrictions on bars, clubs, and restaurants on December 12 in time for the Christmas season and New Year’s Eve. However, the virus did not co-operate {:lol:} as a new variant, Omicron, started to become dominant and case counts spiked rapidly. On December 22 the relaxed rules were reversed, leaving many with food and other supplies that could not be used, at a time when loss of business in the food and hospitality sector had already been significant for a long period of time. This contributed to the growing annoyance about public health restrictions.
This relates to consequences (pandemic pay):
Consequences We heard that much of what government did was to respond to the expected and necessary consequences of public health orders by mitigating their effects on the public and adjusting government service delivery disrupted by the measures. But often ministry response actions also had consequences for other government programs. One example we heard several times related to pandemic pay, which was a temporary increase to the hourly rate paid to certain front-line health-care workers. It had unintended consequences for workers doing similar work, such as caregivers employed in non-acute-care roles who did not qualify for pandemic pay.
This was particularly troubling for agencies that had some workers who qualified and others that did not, which was usually a result of multiple service delivery contracts with different government programs (such as long-term care and youth-in-care group homes), or the provision of services not funded by government. A related consequence we heard about was recruitment efforts for acute-care workers, especially nurses {all stop, but they fired many}, such as higher rates of pay, signing bonuses, or more attractive shift schedules, making it difficult to recruit and retain workers in other social service delivery areas {did these guys forget what the mandates did to already trained and experienced doctors and nurses?}. The acknowledgements given frequently (and deservedly) to health-care workers seldom extended to other essential front-line workers to the same extent. We also heard about government actions that conflicted with the overall priority appropriately placed on the pandemic response. Several areas of government that were less directly affected by the pandemic maintained their focus on pre-existing policy processes, especially those set out in pre-pandemic ministerial mandate letters. This continuing pursuit of “regular business” by some had the effect of putting strains on other government programs that were expected to participate, as well as on stakeholders, who focused on the pandemic response.
[...Findings]
Finding 1: Rebuild trust...
Conclusion Government should identify opportunities to rebuild the trust that existed early in the pandemic to support high levels of compliance should new restrictions be required.
Finding 2: Improve preparation...
Conclusion Government could improve preparation for a future pandemic or other major event by setting a principlebased standard for province-wide emergency preparation. Given the uncertainty and evolving nature of a major event, a principle-based approach would offer guidance but recognize the need for flexibility. Such a standard could create a shared understanding across government about:
• risks and hazards
• available response tools
• expected effects and implications across society
• the required ongoing relationships
• the physical and human resources required to respond
• the approach to communications
• the organizational structures that can be used to manage the response, and when they should be used
The standard would address both a plan and the planning regimen needed to continually practice, test and develop the plan as well as the essential goods, services, and infrastructure needed to execute the plan.
Finding 3: Improve planning...
Conclusion Government should consider developing a planning approach for province-wide emergencies that includes much more than a plan for how government will be coordinated, including risk identification, developing, practising, and continuously improving plans for major emergencies in accordance with the standard suggested in the previous finding.
Finding 4: Enhance the ability to respond...
Conclusion As part of the preparation for province-wide emergencies government could assess the capacity available for emergency response to various hazard scenarios and develop ways to address gaps in anticipated surge capacity needs, including assessing whether changes are needed to the resourcing and structure of the public health function.
Finding 5: Maintain relationships...
Conclusion Government did a good job of using and building relationships, but this could be extended by finding ways to engage new participants and new tables more consistently. Government should consider reviewing membership in the tables it used (and continues to use) to see if there are any gaps, finding reasons to engage with tables that have been dropped—even if just to practice using emergency plans—and maintaining a central stakeholder database. This would both prepare for future province-wide emergencies and facilitate the business of government more generally.
Finding 6: Mitigate supply chain disruption...
Conclusion To be better prepared for future provincial emergency events, the B.C. government could gain a better understanding what goods are essential and the supply chain risks associated with those goods in the event of major disruptions. This would allow it to identify mitigation opportunities both prior to and during an emergency, such as determining whether stockpiles are the best approach to managing essential goods and establishing appropriate structures for managing essential goods. Supply chain issues should be a focus of planning for province-wide emergencies.
Finding 7: Recognize social supply chain importance...
Conclusion Government could develop a better understanding of the broader social supply chain and consider viewing the set of government and unfunded social support services as a system, so that the implications of government decisions on all of the services people rely on are better understood before those decisions are made. To be clear, we are not suggesting that government control or further regulate social services that are not government funded or part of a government program. Rather, we are suggesting that government fully consider the effects of changes to government public policy on the whole social support services environment, including all of the government programs and unfunded social services.
Finding 8: Improve decision-making...
Conclusion We believe there are some improvements that could make decision-making in emergencies better aligned with our standard, which are discussed in the following more detailed findings.
Finding 9: Respond with suitable approaches...
Conclusion The pandemic has revealed that all three approaches (crisis management, emergency management, and business continuity) need to be available and used in the event of a province-wide emergency. Government should consider building this understanding into its emergency planning and ensuring that there is a shared understanding of how these approaches work and to what circumstances each is best suited.
Finding 10: Redefine Emergency Management BC’s role for province-wide emergencies...
Conclusion Government should consider redefining EMBC’s role and approach during a province-wide emergency, without affecting its role related to local emergencies. A redefined role could make EMBC responsible and accountable for cross-government coordination and communication. EMBC’s legitimacy and clout would need to be enhanced by giving it the authority and accountability of a central agency and taking steps to increase the value afforded to emergency management preparation in the culture of the public service. The coordination function could include responsibility for comprehensive cross-government planning for province-wide emergencies, as discussed earlier. Coordination could also include providing channels to resolve implications of one program’s actions on other programs and to bring stakeholder implications to the attention of the lead agency.
Finding 11: Learn from unintended consequences...
Conclusion Government should consider preparing case studies of unintended consequences caused by one program for another program or another ministry’s stakeholders during the pandemic and using them to educate both senior and new public servants to improve decision-making, and to design the coordination role for EMBC discussed in the previous finding.
Finding 12: Build public health knowledge...
Conclusion Government should consider making public health decisions and decision-making processes more transparent so that the kinds of trade-offs being made are better understood. This would include establishing one or more formal advisory groups that the PHO could rely on when making decisions, including expertise COVID-19 LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW 84 from a range of disciplines such as scientific, social science, economic, and behavioural science expertise. Efforts could also be considered to better educate senior government leaders in the function and role of public health.
Finding 13: Improve health data collection...
Conclusion Government should consider how best to deal with the disparate set of IT systems, data definitions, and data collection practices to ensure that the health-care system is able to assemble needed data that is timely and accurate.
Finding 14: Improve communications...
Conclusion Government should consider developing a communications strategy and clarifying roles among the PHO, EMBC, ministries, and GCPE in province-wide emergencies. We have more to say about this in the subsequent findings in this chapter.
Finding 15: Build tolerance for uncertainty...
Conclusion Government should consider building the need to condition the public to expect change into planning for pandemics and other province-wide emergencies, and into the communications strategy (discussed in Finding 14: Improve communications), as an important element of maintaining public trust.
Finding 16: Explain decisions...
Conclusion The Public Health Officer should consider ways to better explain why decisions are being made, possibly including stating what the objectives are for restrictions being put in place or removed, addressing any apparent inconsistencies, and discussing the evidence underlying the decisions. Increased transparency about public health decision-making and establishment of expert advisory panels (suggested in Finding 12: Build public health knowledge) would also contribute to better explanations.
Finding 17: Explain the transparency/privacy trade-off...
Conclusion The balance between privacy and transparency could be more regularly examined and clearly communicated, as necessary to maintain public trust. Government should review its policies to make sure that in principle the balance between privacy and transparency during a public health emergency is reasonable, that the level of data made public is adjusted as the privacy risk changes, and that the need to be prepared to communicate the reasons for such changes is included in the communications strategy discussed in Finding 14: Improve communications.
Finding 18: Improve implementation...
Conclusion The findings in this chapter can help to improve implementation in future provincial emergencies. In addition, consideration should be given to improving access to online government services for those without internet access or the capacity to access services online.
Finding 19: Improve public health order rollout...
Conclusion The Office of the Provincial Health Officer should review its order rollout practices and seek additional public policy and legal resources if needed.
Finding 20: Refine the use of public health tools...
Conclusion The Office of the Provincial Health Officer should consider undertaking a review of public health measures utilized during the pandemic to learn what works best in different circumstances.
Finding 21: Be prepared to enforce...
Conclusion
To be better prepared for future province-wide emergencies, government could ensure that all necessary enforcement resources and coordination structures are in place and ready to be deployed quickly in a coordinated fashion that recognizes the strengths and limitations of all agencies.
Finding 22: Share goals to collaborate on means...
Conclusion The lesson about the value of having shared objectives, together with robust discussion about the best way of operationalizing the objectives, could be emphasized as a fundamental principle underlying government’s approach to implementing major changes.
Finding 23: Leverage non-government resources...
The newly created
vaccine registration system is an example of a successful project that used private sector resources, as was tapping into laid-off hospitality and tourism sector workers to help deliver vaccination clinics and using the private sector to distribute rapid tests.
There were also instances where government missed opportunities to utilize a willing private/not-for-profit sector to support the pandemic response—for example, not using stakeholder associations to their full potential in communicating and explaining COVID-19 orders because written orders and explanatory materials were delayed, as discussed earlier, and an unwillingness to use work camp resources to support vaccination in remote communities. There are barriers to utilizing non-government resources that are challenging to overcome in the heat of a developing province-wide emergency, when that emergency is disrupting the economy and straining limited government resources. But identifying and addressing those barriers when there is no raging province-wide emergency should be easier
Conclusion Preparations for future province-wide emergencies could include preparing to call upon and utilize private/not-for-profit sector expertise and resources where appropriate to support the government response, including having
the legal authority and liability protection in place to do so {this is a very slipper slope}
Finding 24: Co-develop Indigenous preparedness role...{
there was a great deal backstopping the finding}
Conclusion Under DRIPA, government has a commitment to co-develop its structure and plans with Indigenous governments and Indigenous-governed organizations. We expect that the lessons learned from roles and relationships evolved during the pandemic will inform both the co-development of preparations and the plans that emerge. It will be vital for the planning process to be collaborative, co-operative, and consistent with government-to-government relationships. More specifically, consideration should be given to:
• supporting logistical planning and capacity to ensure access to essential goods if supply chains are disrupted, especially in remote and isolated communities
• specifically preparing to mitigate social service delivery disruptions to urban Indigenous populations, in the context of social supply chain preparedness discussed in Finding 7: Recognize social supply chain importance
Finding 25: Respect Indigenous jurisdiction...
Conclusion Canada’s Constitution recognizes the sovereignty and right to self-determination of Indigenous Peoples. Consistent with that, as part of the ongoing joint work of DRIPA, implementation related to emergency preparedness and response, new joint decision making, communications protocols and coordination between First Nations and ministries should be addressed in a manner that respects the inherent jurisdiction of First Nations and recognizes that lack of trust can cause barriers.
Finding 26: Address pandemic overlaps and gaps...
Conclusion Better coordination is needed among the provincial government, federal government, and B.C.’s First Nations to address gaps and challenges. This work should be carried out on a tripartite basis in preparation for future province-wide emergencies. Co-developed protocols and agreements {
MOU's} establishing more clarity, consistency, comprehensiveness, and certainty in the delivery of assistance and services to all Indigenous Peoples, resolving overlaps and gaps revealed by the pandemic response, would be a significant improvement.
[...]
Summary
In summary, the pandemic has provided some key lessons that can be applied to ensure that B.C. is better prepared for the next province-wide emergency. We have identified several areas where improvements can be made by being better prepared, improving communications, better incorporating input into decisionmaking, and addressing organizational issues, including Emergency Management BC’s role. Overall, the B.C. government mounted an effective response to the pandemic {
to a pandemic that never was, except for inculcating mass panic and the most sever methods of control and medical experimentation} demonstrating a balanced public health response based on the principle of minimizing restrictions, and a nimbleness and resiliency that surprised many. There is an opportunity now to build on that response.
{
I'm sure they will work hard to work out the kinks}
Will end this with a brave song during this time, while others of influence floundered:

 
Arrogantly silent.

CTV is late to the party, and it is far worse than all that.



Think this whole thread has been a testament as to their centralization and hammer in BC.

With the link above, had not read the "Covid-19 Lessons Learned Review," so adding the opening letter and any points of interest (much is not added so perhaps save a copy for a rainy day if interested). Pardon for the blue text as its been a tough out of reality experience these last couple of years for all.

There is no doubt that this will shape the next round:



This report is a 150 pages so will skip through ending down to the findings:



The Terms:

There are 3 pages of "pandemic timeline events" (from "January 2020 to May 2022") with graphs, statistically messaged or otherwise.

This is all about the vaccines:

This relates to consequences (pandemic pay):

Will end this with a brave song during this time, while others of influence floundered:

Wow, that's a lot of work you did!

I was getting steamed just reading it all. Very steamed. They couldn't have done all this without the Trusted News Initiative buy in from media. And the lying about numbers. And the hiding of PCR test fallibility to say the least!! And no emphasis on good basic health and the bad effect of 'co-morbidities' and low Vitamin D. I remember writing to our MP and MPP's asking why things like Vitamin D were not mentioned, in the beginning of 2021 that it was clear, all the things that WORKED if you wanted to prevent or treat. Why are these agencies called 'Health' at all. Still steamed....

If I assess 'our' side of this, investigating the numbers, listening to alternative news sources, researching studies on medicines of all kinds that worked, sharing information, and warning friends (almost always uselessly - I shared information with about 2 people that made a difference to their decisions... and alienated a bunch of others!).

Well, that was a LOT of work you did, Voyageur. Thanks for all this overview and apt commentary.
 

Canadian COVID-19 vaccine manufacturer Medicago Inc. shutting down​

Medicago had been preparing to launch commercial-scale production of the vaccine, but its parent company announced Friday it would cease all of its operations, citing changes to the COVID-19 vaccine landscape, global demand for COVID-19 vaccines ,and "Medicago’s challenges in transitioning to commercial-scale production."
 

Interesting little thang that AB and SASK have going on right now.

Saskatchewan Premier Scott Moe told the Trudeau Liberals that his province would not facilitate a national healthcare "digital ID" — even if it's required to secure healthcare funding from the feds.

"The Government of Saskatchewan is not creating a digital ID, nor will we accept any requirements for the creation of a digital ID tied to healthcare funding," penned Moe in a public letter to the province.

Moe said he would refuse the Trudeau Liberals if they required a digital ID for the provinces to secure healthcare funding from them.

According to the Health Information Protection Act, the provincial government is not legally obligated to share "personal medical information."

"The Government of Saskatchewan will not share personal medical information with the federal government. This information is protected under The Health Information Protection Act and will remain so," said Moe.

Saskatchewan only reports publicly on healthcare statistics, such as surgical wait times, which Moe said he is willing to do.

"The Government of Saskatchewan may share already publicly available healthcare statistics, including the number of physicians in Saskatchewan and surgical wait times, if requested by any party, including the federal government," he said.

After concerned citizens expressed grave concerns about the possibility of a federal digital ID, Moe wrote a letter about introducing digital healthcare IDs.

In December, he said the current healthcare cost-sharing arrangement with the federal government is inadequate to meet public demand for medical care.

"At 22% federal funding, 78% provincial funding, I'd just put forward that's not sustainable moving forward, and the healthcare cost-sharing, an investment-sharing arrangement that was brought forward several decades ago, was never anticipated to be with this small of the federal share," said Moe.

Despite Canadians observing median wait times of 27.4 weeks to access medical treatment, including critical surgeries, treatments, and procedures, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau commented: "If I were to send people all the money they need in the provinces, there is no guarantee those folks would be waiting less time in the hospitals."

"There is no point putting more money into a broken system. And those are harsh words," he added.

Moe wants his federal counterparts to return to a "full funding partner" and give Canadians the healthcare they expect.

"In recent years, federal healthcare funding has fallen from 35% of healthcare costs to 22%," he said. "It's critical to get a new Canada Health Transfer (CHT) agreement where the federal government returns to a full funding partner of healthcare."

The premiers demanded a meeting with the prime minister for early 2023 — set for next week — to finalize an agreement. But the Trudeau Liberals said they need specific commitments from the provinces before the feds can increase its share of costs from 22% to 35%.

Moe clarified his government would not surrender or weaken any personal health privacy rights when signing a new CHT agreement.

"Instead, we will work diligently toward a funding agreement that benefits Saskatchewan people by investing in healthcare in both rural and urban areas of our province," he said.

Since 2012/13, Saskatchewan has gradually increased CHT payments from $906 million to $1.33 billion in 2021/22. All other provinces and territories also experienced gradual increases in transfer payments from previous federal governments.

The Government of Canada website says that the CHT is the most significant transfer to provinces and territories and that "it provides long-term, predictable funding for health care and supports the principles of the Canada Health Act, which are: universality; comprehensiveness; portability; accessibility; and public administration."
 
Back
Top Bottom