The Self-Reference Effect explains that information is stored in the memory more effectively when there is something that the individual can relate to on a personal level. This makes sense since much of memory seems to operate through mapped associations. Here's a more thorough description of the effect:
http://opl.apa.org/Experiments/About/AboutSelfReference.aspx
Now, what is interesting is this effect is better established in those who score lower in altruism. Those with higher altruism (self measured) experience memory enhancement though a 'social desirable reference' rather than self reference. The study below explains in more detail. Apparently there are (at least) two different processes for memory depending on how you see others and yourself.
Altruistic People Show No Self-Reference Effect in Memory
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00221309.2011.642027#.UlHTL9Jwqk8
http://opl.apa.org/Experiments/About/AboutSelfReference.aspx
The self-reference effect is the tendency for individuals to have better memory for information that relates to oneself in comparison to material that has less personal relevance. The self-reference effect was first proposed by Rogers, Kuiper and Kirker (1977) in a study expanding the classic depth-of-processing work by Craik and Tulving (1975). In order to understand the mechanisms underlying self-referent encoding, it is important to first review the depth-of-processing model.
Craik and Tulving (1975) proposed the depth-of-processing model to explain variations in memory as a function of the extent to which information is actively processed. In this classic study, the researchers manipulated depth of processing by presenting participants with a series of words; each word was followed by a simple yes or no question. The yes/no questions varied in order to manipulate the level of processing (shallow, moderate, or deep). In shallow processing tasks, participants completed a structural analysis by identifying if the target word was capitalized. At the moderate processing level, participants analyzed phonemic properties to determine if target words rhymed. At the deep level of processing, participants used semantic analysis to determine if words fit within the context of a sentence. Following the task, participants received a surprise recognition test. In this test, participants had to identify which words they had seen in the previous activity (target words) and which words were new (distracter words). Results of the study indicated that participants' memories were more accurate for words that they had processed at a deeper level.
Theorizing that personally-relevant information would be encoded at a deeper level than semantic analysis, Rogers, Kuiper and Kirker (1977) expanded the depth-of-processing study to examine the impact of self-referent encoding. Their experimental design replicated Craik and Tulving's (1975) original study with the addition of a self-referent encoding manipulation that asked participants to judge whether or not target words were self-descriptive. As such, following the presentation of randomly selected words, participants responded to the question, "Does this describe you?" At the end of the manipulation phase, participants recalled as many words as possible. Results indicated that self-referent encoding produced better recall than structural or semantic encoding of the same information. They explained the advantages of self-referent encoding as a function of the more elaborative processes individuals used to relate target information to their own self-concept. The result is that information relating to one's self receives preference in memory and that people organize such information hierarchically above less personally relevant information, thus making self-referential information more salient in memory.
Now, what is interesting is this effect is better established in those who score lower in altruism. Those with higher altruism (self measured) experience memory enhancement though a 'social desirable reference' rather than self reference. The study below explains in more detail. Apparently there are (at least) two different processes for memory depending on how you see others and yourself.
Altruistic People Show No Self-Reference Effect in Memory
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00221309.2011.642027#.UlHTL9Jwqk8
ABSTRACT
The self-reference effect (SRE), by which encoding of information is done in a self-referential manner (e.g., “Does the word describe you?”), enhances subsequent memory performance. It is thought to reflect that self-reference is a highly practiced task in everyday life. Accordingly, it is expected that the types of tasks that produce memory enhancement vary according to individual differences of past experiences. On the basis of neuroimaging studies, we hypothesized that social desirability reference (“Is this word socially desirable?”) produces memory enhancement as with SRE in people who have chosen altruistic behavior frequently. Participants processed trait adjectives in relation to themselves, social desirability, and meaning. Then they performed a free recall task. The self-report altruism scale was used to assess the frequency of past altruistic behavior. Consistent with our prediction, the social desirability reference yielded the best retention in the high-altruism group. SRE was observed only in the low-altruism group.
THE SELF-REFERENCE EFFECT (SRE) IS A BROADLY INVESTIGATED MEMORY PHENOMENON by which memory performance is better when information is processed in relation to self (e.g., the knowledge of one's own personal traits, preferences, and abilities) than when information is processed in relation to someone else or when it is processed for general meaning (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). This phenomenon was first reported by Rogers et al. (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; Rogers, Rogers, & Kuiper, 1979), who showed that memory performance is more enhanced when information is processed as a self-reference task (e.g., “Does the word describe you?” “kind”) than when it is processed as an other-reference task (e.g., “Does the word describe an experimenter?” “strict”) or as a semantic task (e.g., “Does the word have the same meaning as creative?” “truthful”).
To explain what kind of processing of self-reference causes SRE, several theoretical accounts have been advanced since those early studies (Linville & Carlston, 1994; Rogers, 1981; Symons & Johnson, 1997). Rogers et al. (1977) and Keenan and Baillet (1980) explained SRE in terms of the amount of elaboration received during the encoding of words-to-be-remembered. Klein and Kihlstrom (1986) proposed that the organization process (i.e., presented words are categorized as “words that describe me” or “words that do not describe me” and are associated together within each group) is responsible for SRE. Ferguson, Rule, and Carlson (1983) demonstrated that processing the social desirability of the trait adjective (social desirability reference task: e.g., “Is this word socially desirable?” “kind”) enhanced memory to the same degree as self-reference tasks did. Then they suggested that the social desirability of self-reference is a possible cause of SRE. However, this result was not replicated by McCaul and Maki (1984), who did not recognize social desirability as a crucial cause of SRE. The current convergence is that both elaborative and organizational processing underlies SRE (Klein & Loftus, 1988; Symons & Johnson, 1997). Symons and Johnson (1997) reported weaker SRE when comparison-encoding tasks promote both organization and elaboration as a result of meta-analysis of SRE. They also reported that SRE are strongest when stimuli of a certain kind, in this case trait adjectives, are used because trait adjectives are commonly elaborated and organized through self-reference (Maki & McCaul, 1985). Symons and Johnson (1997) concluded that the self-reference process is uniquely efficient (i.e., well organized and well elaborated) solely because it is a highly practiced task in everyday life. Consistent with this explanation, Kesebir and Oishi (2010) and Turk, Cunningham, and Macrae (2008) reported that SRE are observable without an explicit link between self and to-be-processed items, which is a similar situation to those experienced in everyday life. Nakao, Mitsumoto, Nashiwa, Takamura, Tokunaga, Miyatani, and Watanabe (2010) and Nakao, Takezawa, Shiraishi, and Miyatani (2009) reported that self-reference judgment about trait adjectives occurs in everyday life behavior selection (e.g., occupational choice) to bias either choice of behavior.
What remains unconfirmed, however, is whether the difference of past experience affects the memory enhancement phenomenon, as SRE. If the uniqueness of self-reference is attributable to the highly practiced task, then non-self-reference processes that people use every day would produce the same degree of memory enhancement as that observed for SRE: it is possible that the encoding tasks that produce memory enhancement vary according to individual differences of past experiences.
Recent knowledge gained from neuroimaging studies has been useful to construct a specific hypothesis about the relation between SRE and individual differences of past experience. Neuroimaging studies consistently show significant activation within the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) during self-reference (Craik et al., 1999; Fossati et al., 2003; Johnson, Baxter, Wilder, Pipe, Heiserman, & Prigatano, 2002; Kelley, Macrae, Wyland, Caglar, Inati, & Heatherton, 2002; Kjaer, Nowak, & Lou, 2002). The MPFC is thought to have an important function for memory enhancement and SRE. Anatomically, MPFC shares a close relation with the hippocampus, which has important memory-related functions (Parent, Wang, Su, Netoff, & Yuan, 2010; Price & Drevets, 2010). Furthermore, the activity in MPFC during self-reference predicts subsequent memory performance (Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004). However, MPFC activation has been attributed not only to self-reference but also to inferences about another person's mental state (so-called mentalizing; (Frith & Frith, 2003; Ochsner et al., 2004; Vogeley, et al., 2001) and altruistic behavior selection (Greene & Paxton, 2009; Moll et al., 2006).
Based on this evidence, several reports of the literature (Nakao, Mitsumoto et al., 2010; Nakao, Takezawa, Miyatani, & Ohira, 2009) have described that self-reference shares psychological properties with another person's mental state reference and social desirability reference. They specified the shared psychological properties based on functions of neighboring prefrontal areas (i.e., lateral prefrontal cortex and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex), which have reciprocal connections with the MPFC and which have functions in behavior selection (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Kerns, Cohen, MacDonald, Cho, Stenger, & Carter, 2004). That is, they proposed that self-reference, another person's mental state reference, and social desirability reference have functions as criteria in everyday-life behavior selection. These processes bias either choice of behavior for situations, such as occupational choice and interpersonal communication, in which no objective correct answer exists. Nakao et al. reported evidence that supports this explanation: self-reference biases occupation choice (Nakao, Mitsumoto et al., 2010). In addition, the MPFC has functional relations with the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex during the occupation choice task (Nakao, Osumi, et al., 2010). Regarding the effects of individual differences of past behavior selection to MPFC activities, Moll et al. (2006) reported that an individual who has been engaged more in voluntary activities showed more MPFC activity during costly donation. That is, people who had frequently chosen altruistic behavior in the past showed more MPFC activity when they chose behavior not based on self-interest.
When we apply these notions related to MPFC to SRE based on mutual relations between MPFC activation and SRE (Macrae et al., 2004), it becomes credible that not only the self-reference but also the non-self-reference process, which biases behavior selection, produces the same degree of memory enhancement as that observed for SRE. It is likely that individual differences of past behavior selection affect the kinds of tasks that produce memory enhancement. Especially, based on Moll et al. (2006), it is expected that the individual differences of past altruistic behavior affect memory enhancement. Furthermore, it has been reported that the social desirability reference biases altruistic behavior selection (Cialdini et al., 1987; Eisenberg et al., 1989; Tracy & Cross, 1973). For example, Cialdini, Schaller, Houlihan, Arps, Fultz, and Beaman (1987) reported that people with a strong concern about social desirability tended to choose helping behavior. This evidence suggests that highly altruistic people (i.e., people who have chosen altruistic behavior frequently) have referred to social desirability as a criterion for everyday-life behavior selection. Consequently, social desirability referencing can be a highly practiced task in highly altruistic people. We hypothesize that social desirability referencing produces the same degree of memory enhancement as that observed for SRE in highly altruistic people.
The experiment described in this article elucidates whether social desirability referencing that functions in altruistic behavior can produce the same degree of memory enhancement as SRE or not in individuals who have chosen altruistic behavior frequently. For the following experiment, we divided participants on the basis of their respective frequencies of altruistic behavior. The frequencies of past altruistic behavior were assessed by using a questionnaire (Rushton et al., 1981). We used a social desirability reference task (“Is this word socially desirable?”) as the encoding task because the social desirability task is thought to be a highly practiced task in individuals who have chosen altruistic behavior frequently. Moreover, the social desirability reference task has been used in SRE studies (Ferguson et al., 1983; McCaul & Maki, 1984), as previously described. McCaul and Maki (1984) reported that social desirability reference does not enhance memory as much as self-reference. However, no report has described an examination of individual differences of memory performance in both self-reference and social desirability reference tasks. The hypothesis assessed in this study is that the social desirability reference task produces memory performance that is comparable to SRE in participants who have chosen altruistic behavior frequently.
