Was Gurdjieff a Stoic?

Laura said:
One of the other interesting things I found was that this line of philosophers seems to be one of the most important and unsung things going on back then...

I tend to agree. My interest is in Stoic (Stoa) logic. There's a lot of difficulty studying the Stoics since so many writings have been lost. As a result, few sources distinguish between the views of the various Stoics; rather, they tend to ascribe the sayings of any of them to all of them, so those authors must treat the school as a whole, even though they know that this procedure will lead to apparent inconsistencies.

Also, I agree with those Stoics that taught that destructive emotions resulted from errors in judgment, and that a sage, or person of "moral and intellectual perfection", would not suffer such emotions since they wouldn't be making those errors of judgment (Wikipedia). Does that sound like a goal of Gurdjieff's Work?

The Stoics teach that there are four categories: substance, quality, disposition, and relative disposition. These categories are not horizontal; rather the categories are vertical--meaning varying levels of concreteness. That reminds me of Gurdjieff's 'Centers' and his 'A, B and C influences'. Both concepts can be said to incorporate the idea of varying levels of concreteness on a vertical axis, right?

The category 'Disposition' includes times, places, actions, size, and color. It describes the particular situation and attributes of the individual. All the features covered by the category of disposition, including color, are regarded by the Stoics as inherent in the individual. This view harmonizes with the doctrine in Stoic physics that bodies create their own extension and their own time and space, so to speak, through their tonos and activity.

"Tonos" relates to octaves and may be another connection.

[quote author=Wikipedia]
[Note: tonos, ( Greek: “tightening” ) plural Tonoi, concept in ancient Greek music, pertaining to the placement of scale patterns at different pitches and closely connected with the notion of octave species.
[/quote]

These similarities may be tenuous at best, but I thought you might find them interesting if you weren't already aware of them.


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Ref's for the above comments:
_http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stoicism
_http://www.ontology.co/logic-stoics.htm
_http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2009/02/entry-directory-stoic-logic-mates.html
 
Stoic ideas have interesting connection to modern time period politics.

this is on George washington, but I read other founding fathers of america also knew of Cato.
Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot said:
"George Washington was so taken with the character of Cato the younger in Joseph Addison's 1713 play Cato that he made the Roman republican his role model. He went to see Cato numerous times from early manhood into maturity and even had it performed for his troops at Valley Forge despite a congressional resolution that plays were inimical to republican virtue. Washington included lines from the play in his private correspondence and even in his farewell address."

Cato was a later Stoic than the people Laura wrote about. born ~93BC. From what I read on wikipedia it is an interesting story about Cato. he was a political figure in rome.
 
Laura said:
One of the other interesting things I found was that this line of philosophers seems to be one of the most important and unsung things going on back then...
Thank you Laura for posting these extracts on the Stoics, fascinating, they came at a most appropriate time for fitting in with, and exemplifying, some research that I’m currently doing - living in accord with the simplicity of nature.

In no particular order, the following extracts (and some may be paraphrased) leapt out at me.
‘A life of cheerful simplicity’

‘Happiness through the right way of living according to nature’

‘Living consistently with nature - living according to the dictates of the universe … to recognise it as rational and cheerfully conform to it … humbly acquiescing in the universal order … in everything that befalls me … fate guides the willing’

‘Coming into conformity with nature’

‘Developing the virtue of self-control – a virtuous and devout mind’

‘Ethics depend upon understanding the nature of the universe’

‘’Wisdom personified’ is God’s creative principle’

‘In the service of Truth; governing man; citizen of the world; the simplicity of nature; living in the presence – free of anxiety; shamelessness over modesty; indifference to wealth; Physics – the divine nature of the universe’

‘Once elected to use the money, you’re easily able to do so [how true!] and if have none, you will not yearn for it, but will live satisfied with what you have, not desiring what you do not have, nor displeased with whatever comes your way’

There is a lot of food for thought in these extracts that you have given us.
 
Prodigal Son said:
Thank you Laura for posting these extracts on the Stoics, fascinating, they came at a most appropriate time for fitting in with, and exemplifying, some research that I’m currently doing - living in accord with the simplicity of nature.

[snip]

There is a lot of food for thought in these extracts that you have given us.
Thanks for your concise summary, Prodigal Son. This shows exactly why I used the words invigorating and enthusing previously.
 
Thank you for the post. I've always found trying to read all of these greek philosophers as confusing as there are so many of them. I certainly would have never connected cometary information in some of the descriptions. That is amazing to me. Fascinating reading although I would need to read several times just to familiarize all the names and dates and different schools of philosophy. It certainly sounds like they knew what it took to get released from 3D.
 
I'm still digging through a pile of material and thought I'd share some of today's finds since this appears to be a mother-lode of truly valuable ideas and perspectives. What is below is from I.G. Kidd's book "Posidonius - The Translation of the Fragments" which is volume III of a set. You see, nearly everything Posidonius wrote is "lost" and the only thing we have are fragments quoted by other authors and, in a couple cases, actually found on 4th century papyri in the near east. So this work to collect all the bits together in one place is like a treasure, even if its only the tip of the iceberg of what the guy wrote. So, I'll post a bit of it now and then.



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In the first place, we know enough about Posidonius’ life to realise that its international range and experience set a stamp on his thought, writing and society. He was born at Apamea on the river Orontes in Syria around 135 BC. But Apamea had a strong Hellenic element of population, and there is no doubt that Posidonius was a Greek.

As a young man he went to Athens for his higher education where, under the tutelage of Panaetius, the Head of the Stoic School of philosophy, he became himself a convinced adherent of that system. This was before 110 BC., when Panaetius died. Posidonius never returned to Syria, although he retained a sharp interest in Middle Eastern affairs. He settled in Rhodes, where he was granted citizenship and taught philosophy. The choice of Rhodes was interesting. Although Athens was still the major university centre, the Headship of the Stoic School there had passed to Mnesarchus, and Posidonius looked elsewhere. Rhodes was attractive, not only as an independent city, commercially prosperous, go-ahead and with easy links of movement in all directions, but because it was welcoming to intellectuals, for it already had a strong reputation particularly for scientific research from men like Hipparchus; and Posidonius from an early period had displayed strong interest in the sciences.

For once settled in Rhodes, he embarked, probably in the nineties, on a prolonged grand tour or tours of the Mediterranean world, in which through observation of people, customs, environment and phenomena he collected by autopsy and first-hand enquiry much material for his later works. He was certainly in southern Spain, where he probed tidal phenomena, natural resources and environmental ethnology. In southern Gaul he found out what he could of the Celts and northern peoples. Italy and Rome, of course, Sicily, Dalmatia and Greece, North Africa and the East all came under his searching eye in their physical, human and historical backgrounds.

After this he appears to have settled down in Rhodes to writing and teaching. But in accord with Stoic principles, he was no recluse or armchair philosopher. In spite of being a newcomer, he was even elected to high magisterial office, the Prytany, which combined presidential and executive functions; and he was chosen for at least one Rhodian embassy to Rome, in the dangerous year (87/86 B.C.) of Marius’ last consulship and terminal illness. In addition, he had become by his writing an international figure, visited not only by pupils and intellectuals, but by the powerful bully-boys of Rome, such as members of great families like the Metelli. General Pompey found time in 66 BC., in his command against the pirates, to sit in on a lecture, and did so again in 62 B.C., when returning from his campaign in the East, dipping in respect his symbol of power before Posidonius’ door, but in return severely treated to a lecture on the subject ‘There is no good but moral good’, which itself gave rise to a famous anecdote in Roman circles. For the old man was suffering severely from gout, and illustrated his theme by apostrophising his offending leg: ‘It’s no good, pain; bothersome you may be, but you will never persuade me that you are an evil.’ Cicero in his late twenties attended a course of lectures, and later when embarking on his own philosophical works, sent for books of ‘the Maestro’, his Professor. He even paid him the supreme compliment of inviting him to write a monograph on his own much-cherished consulate, which Posidonius diplomatically refused. But this is sure evidence for the literary impact of Posidonius’ style, which was vivid, forceful and ornate, and still shines fitfully but pungently through our surviving fragments. He died in his eighties, somewhere around 51 B.C., when Rhodes was reaffirming her treaty with Rome.

This sketched outline of his life shows not only his great reputation and influence during his life, but also that he was concerned with and very much a part of all aspects of his contemporary world. A main characteristic of that world was the attempted reduction of scattered turbulent elements to a whole, integrated Mediterranean world society through the domination of Rome. It may be fortuitous, but it is not unremarkable that the outstanding feature of Posidonius’ philosophy is the attempt to integrate the complete field of the human intellect and the universe in which it finds itself into a rational system for the explanation of and canon for human behaviour.

RANGE OF INTEREST

Indeed, what strikes us immediately from the evidence that survives and is attested for us is the extraordinary range covered by his work. For not only did he write on all aspects of philosophy, but also on astronomy, meteorology, mathematics, mathematical geography, hydrology, seismology, zoology, botany, anthropology and history. These were not incidental observations, but major investigations in their subject. To take two examples from the thirty or so titles of his books to survive (presumably the most popular): On Ocean and the History were major works in geography and historiography. It is crucial for our understanding of Posidonius to decide whether these were simply part of an all-embracing curiosity and gargantuan encyclopedic interest, or in some way an integral part of his philosophical enquiry.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND THE ARTS

The first thing that is clear from Posidonius’ classification of the arts and sciences preserved in Seneca is that philosophy was without question for him the dominant controlling master art. In philosophy itself he followed the tripartition which had been generally adopted from the fourth century B.c. throughout the Hellenistic period into natural philosophy (including metaphysics and theology), logic and moral philosophy. But Posidonius wished to stress that although the parts were distinguishable enquiries, they were inseparable and organically interdependent. To this end he went out of his way to abandon the common Stoic simile for philosophy, where logic was said to be the wall around the orchard protecting the trees of natural philosophy which produced the fruit of ethics. He substituted the image of philosophy as a living creature where natural philosophy was the blood and flesh, logic the bones and sinews, and ethics the soul.

Now this view was particularly relevant to Stoic philosophy, for the Stoic cosmos which it studies was itself regarded as an organic unified being, a material continuum of which human beings are one of the organic parts. Therefore, the human philosophical end of moral behaviour is itself dependent on the enquiry into the whole, and so moral philosophy is organically related to natural philosophy. Furthermore, since this cosmic whole was nothing more than the material universe to whose operation we have access, the physical and behavioural sciences and arts would seem to be in some way relevant.

This relationship of what we would call the arts and sciences to philosophy was in fact debated ground in earlier philosophy. Plato had regarded the sciences, or rather theoretical ones like pure mathematics, merely as a propaedeutic to philosophy. Epicurus, the Cynics and the Sceptics had dismissed them as useless. Aristotle, it is true, had engaged seriously in scientific research, and indeed some subsequent Peripatetics became more involved in separate scientifically-based pursuits than philosophical. And there was a continuing exchange of interest between philosophy and medicine, but often displayed more in paradigm, analogy and simile. The earlier Stoics were curiously ambivalent. Zeno had first rejected the sciences in his early Cynic days when writing his Republic, but later admitted some light to be gained from them. One of his pupils, Ariston of Chios, sneered at those studying them, while Chrysippus, the most famous and influential Stoic, granted that they rendered a service, but seems to have spent no time on them in his voluminous writing, and it is not clear what service he thought they rendered.

To Posidonius the relationship between science and philosophy was a major issue. He was quite clear that the sciences and arts were not a part of philosophy, even although their investigations might cover the same or similar ground. Thus both astronomy and natural philosophy studied celestial phenomena, historiography and moral philosophy studied human behaviour. The crucial difference, as he saw it, lay in that only philosophy could give first and final causes and explanation, which he considered its key function.

Indeed Posidonius pursued aetiology so relentlessly that he became known in antiquity as the Aetiologue. Not, of course, that science did not illustrate causes and offer explanations from observed factual evidence — indeed they could sometimes offer alternative possible explanations — but it was beyond their technological capacity to find ultimate causes or explanation. This was because their prime function was descriptive rather than explanatory, although such description and analysis could clarify immediate cause and effect. As such they are, in fact, for Posidonius the tools of philosophy (thus supplanting the earlier-held function of logic), and indeed necessary tools in working out the natural behaviour of phenomena. So the relationship between philosophy and science is complementary, and the attempt to work this out on such a cosmic scale is the most remarkable contribution of Posidonius. It is infuriating that because of our fractured evidence, and more particularly because of the limited interest and understanding of men like Strabo, who used his more scientific works, but disapproved of his deeper aetiological interests, that we are now lacking demonstration of how Posidonius actually operated on the borderline where for him philosophy and science met, in the limbo-land of hypotheses and the differentiation between different kinds of causes and explanations.

NATURAL PHILOSOPHY; THE SCIENCES

Although Posidonius regarded the parts of philosophy as interlocked and interdependent, he recommended for teaching or exposition purposes to begin with natural philosophy. Stoics had different preferences here, Zeno and Chrysippus beginning with logic. But Posidonius’ decision was particularly reasonable for Stoic materialism.

THE BASIC AXIOMS OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY

The Stoic philosophical system was one of great economy, since everything flows from the initial assumption of the operation of two principles, one active and one passive, throughout a material, defined, cosmic continuum. The active principle is the rational, divine, providential, enforming, individualising, governing cause; the passive is unqualified substance. They are diffused inseparably throughout the whole universe, but at different tensions or levels of power. There is no part without them. Some positions immediately follow:

(a) The world is rationally organised, and so explicable and understandable. The pattern is complete throughout.

(b) Within the organisation different elements and parts are dynamic and governing, others are passive in function.

(c) The world is purposefully providential; so there is also a design as well as a pattern, and the good end is discoverable by the rational understanding of this.

(d) The divine element is completely and only immanent.

(e) As the system is an organic whole, the understanding of any part contributes to the understanding of the whole, and vice versa. Even the operation of any part is relevant to the operation of the whole.

(f) The operational law of cause and effect runs right through the behaviour of phenomena and of living creatures.

(g) The understanding and explanation of its operation lies within, and only within, itself.

Posidonius was completely orthodox in accepting the above fundamental scheme for Stoicism. It did, however, raise problems and criticism with which he became engaged. For example:

THE PRINCIPLES

What was their status in a wholly material world? Since they were defining and enforming forces and the causal operation of the world, in Stoic theory they had to be material, since only matter could act or be acted upon. On the other hand, they were distinguished from elements — fire, air, etc. — which were themselves formed and subject to change, destruction and regeneration. Therefore, the principles were said to be material but themselves without form or quality. But what could unformed matter be, a question already critically raised by Plato, and by Aristotle.

Hitherto, Stoic answers confined their search within a physical category, defined by limit, or affectability, or as a space filler characterised by resistance. Posidonius abandoned such physical explanations and defended on logical grounds: that the principles never ‘exist’ separately, but always co-exist in a particular form and matter. So they can only be distinguished as principles conceptually, although their function is material So again, substance (matter without quality or shape) differs from matter in thought only, being the same in reality. In these new approaches Posidonius was not a heretical Stoic (as he is often taken to be), but a reinterpreter of the fundamental doctrines with new arguments caused by subsequent criticism. Also in this area, he showed an interest in the problem of change within and change to identity, through substantial and qualitative change.

PROBLEMS OF FINITE/INFINITE IN A CONTINUUM

Other problems which exercised Posidonius related to finite/infinite, for example the Stoic view of a finite continuum of a universe surrounded by an infinite void, which was much attacked. Or again, the problem of ‘now’ and ‘time’, much debated by the ancients; that is, the problem of the imposition of a finite limit (‘now’) on an infinite continuum of time. Since limit is a timeless concept and the continuum is continuous and infinitely divisible, he appreciated that there can be no atomic instant or unit of time. So, in the analysis of ‘now’ he distinguished a conceptual limit of before and after which is itself timeless, from ‘now’ in a temporal sense as ‘the least perceptible time’. This is a remarkable anticipation of William ]ames’s ‘specious present’ (Principles of Psychology).

GOD

Another aspect of the active principle important for Posidonius was the rational, governing, providential characteristic nominated divine or god; so theology was truly a form of natural philosophy. Thus, god is not only immanent, but the prime constituent of the material universe. There is nothing without the divine, although it varies in tension from the lowest function of cohesion to the highest of pure rationality. Posidonius defined this all-pervading divine active principle as a triad: god, nature, fate. But this was obviously to clarify the three major aspects of the same thing. ‘God’ described the nature of the governing principle; ‘nature’ defined its field, i.e. the physical continuum of which it is the dominant constituent; and ‘fate’ referred to its law of operation.

DIVINATION

Since there was complete interrelation of all parts in the purposeful operation of the universe through the orderly unfolding of everything that happens, and since the pattern of this was rational, as the active principle is reason, and so in theory comprehensible, Posidonius believed in forms of divination as a species of scientific prediction even, he thought, verifiable by results. As it was possible to predict the future behaviour of phenomena such as tides, or the position of the heavenly bodies from the observation and analysis of the pattern of celestial terrestrial infiuences, so it should be possible to predict future human events from similar patterns and signs. Later writers such as Augustine even attributed a hard form of divination to Posidonius, namely that the stars influence as well as are signs of human events; the evidence for that is negligible.

DETERMINISM AND CAUSATION

As the rational law permeated the whole universe, Posidonius, as other Stoics, was a determinist in the sense of thinking that all events followed an unbroken chain of cause and effect. But since the law was rationally determined, it was (at least theoretically) rationally comprehensible. In other words, we can understand the function of our world and our own part in it by observing the pattern of interrelation through cause and effect.

But since this pattern follows through to immediate phenomena, at this lower end it can be revealed by scientific observation, techniques and analysis. So the pattern of the movement of the heavens could be probed by astronomy, that of the lower atmosphere by meteorology; the pattern of terrestrial phenomena by earth and sea sciences, biology, geography, etc. Hence these subjects engaged Posidonius’ serious attention with some remarkable results. For example, he successfully illuminated the natural pattern of celestial influence on terrestrial phenomena by an astonishingly complete theory of lunar periodicity of tides, which rightly held sway until Newton. The diurnal and monthly cycles were confirmed through his own observations at Gades; his initial mistake of putting annual maxima at the solstices instead of equinoxes was through being misled by Seleucus’ observations in the Indian Ocean.

Or again, his remarkable work On Ocean began with the tracing of our terrestrial geographical zones from the celestial zones fashioned from the apparent movements of the heavenly bodies, and from the diurnal and annual paths of the sun. His famous attempt at measuring the circumference of the earth was based on the difference of elevation of the star Canopus (or Carinae) at two separate places on a north/south meridian of the earth (Rhodes and Alexandria). The proportion of the difference of elevation to the full celestial circle of the ecliptic (1/48 according to the Posidonian figures) is then the same as the measurable distance between the two locations to the complete terrestrial circle of the earth’s meridian. But these calculations (admittedly inaccurate, or at least approximate) offered a method of deriving a scheme of bands of latitude. For from one approximation, 1° of latitude equals 500 stades, an equation in fact later adopted by Ptolemy. These bands of latitude, klimata in Greek, in turn accounted for climatic patterns affecting physical and geographical topography and biological phenomena. And from this, the pattern finally proceeded naturally to human geography and explanatory ethnography. That this book has not survived in its entirety is a major loss. For although it was famous and geographers like Strabo quoted extensively from it, Strabo, for one, did not understand either the full scope or the design of the work.

This may illustrate the importance and seriousness of Posidonius’ numerous scientific works for his philosophical investigations. But in their revelatory descriptions and analyses in plotting the factual map of phenomena, and even in their alternative hypothetical explanations, the sciences were no more than necessary tools. One aspect of this is shown by their method, an inductive inference working back from particular observation. Posidonius certainly did not devalue that, but in his view, cosmic design was imposed rationally from the top down, and so final explanation must follow similar procedure, to give meaning to the pattern partially unveiled or checked from ‘the facts’, from the bottom up. This is illustrated from another part of his philosophy, logic.

LOGIC; MATHEMATICS


The most interesting thing that we know of Posidonius’ logic is that he appears deliberately to have rejected the most commonly held view, at any rate since Aristotle, who was followed by the Epicureans, of its philosophical function as the Organon or tool of philosophy, its defence through the examination of the cogency of arguments. For as we have seen, he abandoned the usual Stoic simile where logic was the defensive wall protecting the orchard of philosophy, and substituted the image of an organic living creature, where logic was the bones and sinews of its movement.

This central and dynamic role shows its importance for Posidonius,‘ but unfortunately the ancients regarded Chrysippus as the Stoic logician, and so few details of Posidonius’ logic have come down to us. But there is enough to show that he placed major emphasis on apodeictic logic, that is, deductive procedure from assured premisses or axioms to valid and true conclusions. So, in his analysis of the logical base of relational syllogisms, which as far as we know he may have been the first to undertake, he argued that their validity depends on the implied force of an axiom, much in the same way as mathematical proof depends on a prior set of self-evident axioms. Thus, syllogisms on equality or mathematical equations depend for their validity on the implied force of ‘things equal to the same thing are equal to each other’ accepted as a self-evident axiom.

This comparison of logic and mathematics gives force and meaning to Posidonius’ great interest in and engagement with mathematics; it was recognised by Galen, who called Posidonius the most scientific of the Stoics because he was trained in mathematics, and because of his stress on apodeictic proof. The methodological link betrays that Posidonius was thinking of mathematics as the sub-science for logic, and the closeness of the link is revealed by the passion of his attack on Zeno of Sidon’s Epicurean mathematics. For what he was attacking there was an empirical methodology of mathematics, whereas he not only supported Euclidean axiomatic geometry, but regarded that as the key pattern for the methodology of his whole philosophy.

This is so because the axiomatic methodology of topdown apodeictic proof is precisely the method of Posidonius’ aetiology or philosophy of explanation, whereby he established conclusions from first causes. In terms of natural philosophy, it is thus the pattern whereby it is possible to unravel the deterministic relationship of cause and effect operative throughout the world. The first premisses or first causes are supplied by natural philosophy, and deductively from these ‘axioms’ are derived the explanation of necessarily true conclusions.

The entanglement of mathematics and natural philosophy went still further with traces of mathematical realism. For he regarded some mathematical limits, such as plane surface, not merely as conceptual but as existing in reality, probably since he saw shape or form as a corporeal containing limit which is the cause of definiteness, limitation and inclusion of that which is contained or limited. Such apodeictic proof also governed the movement of his ethical argument, so it was no exaggeration for Posidonius, the Aetiologue, to claim that logic was indeed the bones and sinews of his whole philosophy. It does turn out that it was for him not only the dynamics of philosophy, but the reflection, embodiment and thus explanation of the top-down operation of the whole material Stoic universe.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY; HISTORIOGRAPHY PSYCHOLOGY

Moral philosophy too is grounded for Posidonius in natural philosophy. This is because it depends on his psychology, and as with other Stoics, philosophy of mind was even classified as a section of natural philosophy. As indeed today in universities, psychology as a discipline is based in Science Faculties, but also of course with important consequent involvement in Faculties of Arts. Also, Stoics stressed that psyche, mind or soul, was itself material. But, in addition, Posidonius stressed that in the Stoic cosmic view the rational mind of human beings was akin to the active principle of the cosmos; not, obviously, at its most pure or strongest tension, but still strong enough to govern the human being on the analogy that his rational mind is the counterpart of, indeed part of the same stuff as the divine active designer of the cosmos. This is what Marcus Aurelius meant by saying (5.27) that it was a fragment of god. Two major consequences follow from this axiomatic premiss:

(a) Determinism and Free Will

The Stoics believed in a rigidly determinist scheme of physical events as cause and effect imposed throughout the cosmos by the design of the active principle. So it follows that human freedom of will depended on the actual conscious participation and share in the determining factor by individuals through their own rationality, and displayed through understanding and self-control.

(b) Moral End and Happiness

Since the cosmic rational principle by Stoic definition is by its very nature providential towards good, human rationality, its counterpart naturally sets the goal and is the criterion for right conduct and moral good. Thus, the end and happiness for humans lie in moral goodness and in that alone, thus fulfilling their part in the cosmic scheme. This is the purest form of the very Greek equation — so marked through the whole history of Greek philosophy — of rationality and goodness.

But all men are not good, despite the possibility offered by the rational principle. Some are actually vicious, but practically everyone is neither good nor bad, but inbetween or a mixture, sometimes good and sometimes bad. How can that be? Clearly because of distorting factors and influences, whether internal, such as emotional disturbance, or external. For internal, Posidonius naturally returned to psychology, and here he differed fundamentally from Chrysippus in what had become orthodox Stoicism. Posidonius, however, claimed that he was returning to explain the earlier crucial doctrines of the founders which Chrysippus had distorted. Chrysippus had argued for a monolithic structure of mind, as a single substance (i.e. not divisible into parts) with a single capacity or faculty, the rational. Therefore, emotions for Chrysippus were a kind of rational judgement, or misjudgement. Posidonius believed that in that case Chrysippus could not explain the occurrence of emotion or passion, how it arose, or how it affected judgement; nor how there could be mental conflict, nor indeed what could be meant by a governing factor or control in mind. And so, while he agreed that the human mind was a single substance, not a combination of parts (as Plato had it), he argued that it had a distinguishable plurality of capacities or faculties depending on how it was qualified or disposed, namely the rational capacity and two irrational capacities of emotion and desire.

He even made use of the famous Platonic metaphor for the soul, of the charioteer of reason driving two horses, but strictly within his own Stoic psychology. This was harking back against Chrysippus to a more Platonic/Aristotelian psychology; and for all we know, and Posidonius certainly implied this, the founders of Stoicism may not have disagreed. But our reporters make clear that Posidonius’ psychology was distinctively Stoic in his view of the interplay and interrelationship of status and function of these rational and irrational affinities (oikeiosis, a Stoic technical term).

From this psychology, Posidonius recognised in human beings three natural affinities related to each of the aspects of mind: pleasure through the desiring factor, power from the passionate factor, and the morally good as the natural goal of the rational factor. And he criticised Epicurus for recognising only the first, and Chrysippus for recognising only the last. To do so, he said, was to be blind to facts from the observation of human behaviour from children onwards.

But the three affinities, although all natural, were by no means in the same ethical value category. Indeed, only one, the end of the rational value, had absolute value; as he put it: ‘Some people are deceived into thinking that what belong to the irrational powers of the soul as natural goals, are natural goals without qualification; what they don’t know is that pleasure and power over one’s neighbour are goals of the animal aspect of our soul, while wisdom and all that is good and moral together are the goals of the rational and divine aspect’ .

It has been widely believed that Posidonius, unorthodoxly for a Stoic, elevated so-called external and physical goods, such as wealth and health, to a status of moral value. But this is disproved both by Seneca and by his own psychology. He denied them the category of ‘good’, although natural, and they remained firmly in the Stoic class of intermediate relative preference in choice, but of moral indifference.’ So Posidonius’ psychology is distinguished by the combination of and yet complete distinction between absolute and relative in value, that is, reserving ‘good’ only for what was choiceworthy without qualification, and yet not rejecting relative ‘natural’ worth; and also by control through the function of governing and governed in moral behaviour. So the end for human behaviour is not to achieve or amass physical or external advantages, but the mental control of moral action as defined by the rational understanding of the human constitution and of the cosmic design as related to humans. Only moral good — the object of rationality — was good (i.e. without qualification); the goals of the irrational factors, although natural, were only to be ‘preferred’ in a qualified way and when directed by the rational moral judgement. Also, since ‘good’ was absolute, the criterion of goodness did not lie in results which could be deflected beyond the agent’s control, but only in the correct moral choice of action, or intention, which was in the control and power of his governing moral faculty — reason — and that alone.

By this new psychology Posidonius could both distinguish and yet integrate the Stoic rational moral philosophy of absolute value and their ‘intermediate’ or preparatory philosophy of ‘appropriate acts’ based on ‘what is according to nature’. Earlier critics of the Stoics had objected that there was a misfit between the two, and that the intermediate criteria of these initial natural affinities of childhood and immaturity seemed to be abandoned across the chasm of rational absolutism; some Stoics like Antipater were starting to introduce them into definitions of the end. Posidonius cut through that dilemma by confining the end uncompromisingly to the understanding and aetiology of the rational. But through his enlarged scheme of natural affinities he claimed that he could now explain moral mistakes and deviations.

PHILOSOPHY OF EMOTION

The key to this, he claimed, lay in the philosophy of emotions, which was at the centre of his moral philosophy and which he expounded in an important work, On Emotions, of which a good deal has come down to us through Galen. At the beginning of Bk 1 he wrote, ‘I believe that the examination of things good and evil, and that of ends, and that of virtues, all depends on the correct examination of emotions’. Elsewhere he elaborated: ‘All the doctrines of ethical philosophy are bound as if by a single cord to the knowledge of the powers of the soul . . . Once the cause of the emotions was seen, it broke the absurdity (of the Chrysippean explanation of the End), showed the sources of distortion in choice and avoidance (of good and evil), distinguished the methods of training, and made clear the problems concerning the impulse that rises from emotions’.

Basically, he explained a moral ‘mistake’ thus: in cases where a person was inadequately educated either in rational understanding or in his life habits, giving more rein to his irrational natural aspects of mind to overrate the objects of emotions and desires, then such false beliefs that these objects are proper without qualification trigger an impulse to become overbearing (the Stoic definition of passion), which in turn through its ‘emotional pull’ (a phrase coined by Posidonius) could demand assent to it and so distort his rational decision to a particular act by overriding his moral reason.

This led to a fundamental difference from Chrysippean Stoicism in the cause of evil or immorality. For as Chrysippus’ psychology was solely rational, regarding passion and desire as mistaken judgement, it was difficult to see where the corruption of reason could come from, since reason in itself could not corrupt itself, nor, as Posidonius put it, overstep its own limits to create an ‘overbearing’ or ‘excessive impulse’ or emotion. So Chrysippus had argued that sources of corruption could only be external through the magnitude of external impressions or forces. On the contrary, Posidonius insisted that the ‘root’ of evil or vicious action is internal, the ‘seed’ lying in the natural pathology of our own minds. He does not, of course, deny that the seed can be activated by external forces, but these are subordinate causes; the principal cause of right and wrong lies within our own minds and is our own responsibility. Each person alone is responsible for his or her own moraljudgements and decisions.

PRACTICAL ETHICS, MORAL EDUCATION AND THERAPEUTICS

Posidonius’ views on these now follow from this psychology. Traditionally, Stoicism seemed to offer two philosophies:

(a) the ideal, purely rational logos training of metaphysical and natural philosophy analysing the necessary conditions and functions of the perfect wise man, infallible in judgement and of unassailable happiness;

(b) an intermediate preparatory training by moral rules prescribing ‘appropriate acts’ (kathekonta) based on ‘what is natural’ (kata physin), directed to the ordinary man (phaulos) or ‘progressor’ (pro/topton) in philosophy.

As has been said, critics tended to stress the gap between them and to question their relationship. Posidonius did not, of course, relinquish the ideal goal or portrait of the wise man, which after all was the explanation of all else, but he certainly concentrated for practical purposes on the ordinary man, for whom he insisted both philosophies had to be practised. For he objected to Chrysippus’ medical analogy of health for the wise man, and sickness for the ordinary man.‘ He pointed out that there could be no physical condition of unassailable and timeless health for any human, wise or not; so that part of the analogy confused the facts. Rather, the ordinary man was both healthy and sick; healthy, although certainly ‘prone to sickness’ (another mot coined by Posidonius), when making right decisions, sick when making wrong ones. So, both philosophies and trainings were necessary for him (F163EK), the one directed to his rational mind, the other to his mental pathology of irrational emotive aspects.

(a) The rational aspect could be trained when he was sane, to understand that he should ‘follow in everything the daimon in oneself (i.e. reason) which is akin and has a similar nature to the one which governs the whole universe, and not deviate and be swept along with what is worse and beast-like’ (i.e. our irrational aspects). This is the task of natural philosophy and logic, because the end is ‘to live contemplating the truth and order of all things together and helping in promoting it as far as possible, in no way being led by the irrational part of the soul’. The aim is the understanding of the structure and operation of the cosmos and our positive function in it, and from this to recognise our rationality, not our ‘emotional pulls’, as our directing force. The understanding, with the help of logic’s bones and sinews, leads to explanation, or aetiology in action, through the pattern of cause and effect from the design in moral action. So Posidonius on the moral ‘indifference’ of health and wealth, did not rely solely on orthodox arguments on ‘natural’ values or ‘preferences’; he concentrated on their effect and function in moral psychology, and argued that such physical and external advantages were revealed as merely antecedent causes in the moral pattern, never as principal cause, which was our moral rationality only.'

(b) However, when the ordinary man is morally sick through overbearing ‘emotional pulls’, different methods must be adopted, because Posidonius argued pertinently that irrational states did not respond easily to rational argument; non-rational methods must be used. Typically, he argued this from observation of factual behaviour in children and adults. He noted, for example, the irrational power of vivid mental pictures or imagination. Thus, a person under the influence of heroin will not be persuaded to quit by rational arguments that he is likely to die, but will be emotionally motivated to stop by a vivid mental picture of someone, or himself, dying.

Also he observed that emotions, unlike logical and mathematical axioms, rise and abate in time; therefore, the irrational training of habituation is most appropriate, so that once the excessive passion is tired out or sated, one can gain control of the runaway horse.

So too he thought that there were observed links of emotional movements following physical states of physiognomy, or environment, which merit their own treatment. What is in question here is the therapeutics of mental pathology, and it is notable that the Greek for disease and excessive emotion or passion is the same (pathos): excessive emotion, because it deserves noting against the modern vulgate, that no Stoic, and certainly not Posidonius, sought to eradicate emotions entirely, which the ideal man experienced, and were indeed stressed by Posidonius as an observable and necessary part of our natural mental constitution. Of course, in addition to such training, external moral rules must be imposed, since the patient is unable to apply his own rules of principle or categorical imperatives. Seneca made clear that Posidonius elaborated a whole category of admonitory ethics including different methods of persuasion, exhortation and descriptive exempla.

THE HISTORY


In a sense, Posidonius’ great History may have been intended partly to supply such an exemplary function, as Plutarch’s Lives more obviously and directly were intended as moral patterns. But the History is much more complex, and serves as the sub-science or tool for Posidonius’ moral philosophy. In On Emotions, Posidonius criticised Chrysippus on three grounds: respect for the facts, understanding sprung from explanation of the causes of phenomena, and consistency derived from deductive proof. All three were prime rules for Posidonius’ own philosophy, and the History helped to supply evidence for the first two as a descriptive collection of the actual behaviour of persons, societies and nations to each other and in reaction to their environment, with an attempt at an analysis of historical cause in the resulting pattern.

The History itself was a major work in its own field, much used and quoted by subsequent writers, consisting of 52 books covering the period from 146 B.C. (and so deliberately following Polybius’ History) to probably the mid-eighties, and was possibly unfinished. Its range and scope was formidable, covering the whole of the Mediterranean-centred world from Asia Minor to Spain, Egypt and Africa to Gaul and the northern peoples to Jutland, and of course, at the centre, the Roman and Greek worlds.

The first obvious characteristic from the fragments is the richness of detail covering the whole canvas of historical description, of facts and events, major and minor, local and global, and of social and environmental phenomena. It can range from wild turnips and carrots in Dalmatia to the martial disarray of Apameans, or details of luxurious formal banquet, and to the characteristics and habits of individuals and nations in the account of their social and political behaviour.

Deliberately collected from his extensive travels and subsequent enquiries, this is the vast factual description which forms the canvas for his analysis of human behaviour. But the most interesting thing about the History is its aetiology or historical explanation. It is that of a moral philosopher. Indeed Athenaeus, the indefatigable magpie of the end of the second century A.D., in his Learned Table Talk, characterised Posidonius’ History as being in tune with his philosophy; this may well have come from Posidonius himself. The work itself bears this out in its descriptive aetiology:

(a) Its account consistently displays that although external circumstances, both human and environmental, may be contributory factors to action, real motive is not imposed from without, but from internal character, an analysis in direct, and surely deliberate, opposition to other historians like Polybius. This view is illustrated not only in individuals of power, but in national character. The migratory invasions of the Cimbri, a major and disruptive historical event of the period, was not to be explained merely by the natural phenomena of floods pushing them back from their native Jutland, but by their own inherent piratical and nomadic character. This explains Posidonius’ preoccupation with ethnology (Italian, Roman, Celtic (Gallic), German) as historical explanation; it is used as historical ethology.

(b) To drive this point home, Posidonius was willing to expand an incident beyond its mere historical importance. His brilliant, vividly detailed and lengthy account of the brief career of Athenion, the Athenian tyrant of 88 B.C., far outruns what was a comparatively insignificant event in the Mithridatic Wars. But Posidonius was intent on unmasking in detail the disastrous effect, and how it came about, of an immoral so-called philosopher tyrant on the silly Athenian mob, however briefly.

(c) This indicates another notable moral preoccupation of the History: its reiterated interest in the relationship between ruler and ruled, in all permutations, whether in a voluntary subordination, or as ruler and slaves; it involves the character of both ruler and ruled, and their relationship. And of course, this reflects in the historical medium the working out of the moral axiom of the element of rational rule controlling the subordinate, or its failure to do so. There is much else, of course, including a sustained attack on popular legend and superstition in favour of rational explanation through cause and effect. So the History, like the sciences and mathematics, is a necessary investigation for his philosophy. But again, it can offer no more than historical explanation; final explanation must come from the axioms established by moral philosophy.

INFLUENCE AND IMPORTANCE

Posidonius continued to be read and regarded as an important authority at least until the sixth century A.D. His influence has in the past been overestimated, but he was certainly widely consulted for three centuries after his death; our surviving evidence suggests that his later influence was greater outside his own School. For the later history of Stoicism shows that Chrysippus was still regarded as the principal authority. Thus, our main evidence for Posidonius’ important philosophy of emotion comes from Galen, the great doctor of the second century A.D., who was an adherent of the Academy, and who used Posidonius to attack Chrysippus. It was Posidonius’ scientific works, and On Ocean, and the History which continued to be plundered for information and detail, with the result that the grand design of his encyclopedic research was forgotten. And this is a pity, for Posidonius’ place in intellectual history does not derive from the scattered riches of a polymath, but from an audacious panoptic attempt to understand, and hence explain in its complete context, our material world by the rationality of its operation, checked where we can by observation of the facts, and so define our own behaviour in it.

Posidonius was not an eclectic thinker, as has been claimed, but he strongly believed in the continued development of philosophy from positions of the old and, to him, established authorities. In fact, his synoptic determination to see things as part of wholes, where the perfection of the whole gives meaning to the parts, his willingness to explore to the limits the thesis that the common rationality of the cosmic order and the function of our own comprehension is the only possible means of explanation and understanding, and hence that our behaviour, morality and happiness in the end should depend on that alone, is the drawing together under the formal cloak of Stoicism, some of the most important and stimulating threads running through the whole of Greek philosophy. But his most important contribution was to enlist and integrate with philosophy the whole range of intellectual disciplines open to human investigation.
 
Fascinating!
I did some digging of my own and found a conference contribution about the relation between Posidonius and Pompey in regard of the romanizing influences of empire building, which I think is worth quoting from.

Source: _http://www.digressus.org/articles/romanizationpp099-110-franklin.pdf

Services to Pompey: the nature of Posidonius’ relationship with him

Posidonius had held public offices in Rhodes; his high standing within that
community is apparent from the fact that he had also represented the Rhodians on
embassies to Rome.17 As for his intellectual activities, as Panaetius’ successor in the
Stoic school on Rhodes, Posidonius clearly had much authority of his own as a
philosopher; he appears to have had a steady stream of Greek and Roman students
there, although we know nothing about the organisation of the school.18 By the 60s he
had presumably written the bulk of his philosophical and historical works, which from
the remaining fragments appear to have been unusually extensive.
Pompey visited Posidonius on Rhodes on at least two occasions, in 66 and 62
BC. While he may have gone to the island for reasons more practical than intellectual
(Florus suggests that it was to increase his naval resources19), he took time to consult
the philosopher in the midst of his busy schedule, and the fact that he went to see
Posidonius for a second time (at least) indicates that he felt he had profited from his
associations with the philosopher.

The question remains, however, of how much influence Posidonius exerted on
Pompey. From the hard evidence, their association was not a close one, and it has not
been given much weight by scholars interested in Pompey’s associates.20 Yet they
may have met on more occasions than have been recorded, or corresponded (Cicero
was in touch with both men in this way); although to benefit from Posidonius
intellectually, Pompey need not have spent a great amount of time with him, as he
could have read his books. Their attitude towards one another was one of mutual
respect. Pompey lowered his fasces in front of Posidonius’ door upon his return from
the east in 62, a mark of great honour; and, perhaps in 66, Posidonius gave him the
advice, ‘be ever the best, and pre-eminent over others’, quoting Peleus’ advice to his
son Achilles (Iliad VI.208), which Kidd has suggested indicates a paternal attitude
towards Pompey on Posidonius’ part.21

There are less well-attested ways that Pompey may have benefited from
Posidonius. Chief among these is the possibility that Posidonius wrote an account of
Pompey’s activities, as a monograph. He is likely to have completed his Histories, a
continuation of Polybius, by the time he met Pompey (it seems only to have gone
down to the 80s BC), but Strabo also refers to τὴν ἱστορίαν ... περὶ αὐτόν (sc. τὸν
Πομπήῗον) in his Geography, which may have been a separate work dealing with
Pompey’s career.22

There has been a certain amount of argument as to whether this work in fact
existed independently of the Histories. Put briefly, the case for the monograph argues
that the Histories could not have covered the time of Pompey’s campaigns if, as the
Suda states, they were in 52 books and were a continuation of Polybius.23 Book 49
dealt with the Marsian war of 91-89 BC,24 while the last known fragment relates to 86
BC.25 The timescale involved seems too great for the narrative to cover from the early
80s down to Pompey’s activities in the 60s in just three books. It is thus argued that
Posidonius wrote up Pompey’s campaigns separately in the ‘History’ referred to by
Strabo, who mentions that this was specifically about Pompey.

Modern commentators have varied in their opinions on the existence of such a
monograph. Reinhardt postulated its existence,26 but many other scholars, including
Aly, Malitz, Theiler, and Kidd have been sceptical.27 It is evident that Posidonius did
write about Pompey in some form, as Strabo elsewhere accuses Posidonius of being
ignorant regarding information, which, he says, he should have known about from
Pompey (see below, footnote 59). Since, chronologically, this seems unlikely to have
fitted into the scope of the Histories, it seems sensible to me to propose that he wrote
such a monograph.

While no definite solution can be reached on the question of the monograph,
its existence certainly seems a possibility, given Posidonius’ undoubted literary ability.
An additional piece of evidence testifies to this: the fact that Cicero asked him to write
up his own account of the suppression of Cataline ‘ornatius’, 28 suggests that
Posidonius was acclaimed as a stylist, and Cicero may have been encouraged to ask
the favour because of the success of Posidonius’ earlier work on Pompey. Whatever
the case was, it demonstrates the impact that Posidonius’ learning had upon Cicero.
We do not know if it was just his prose style, or also his penetrating political analysis
which had impressed Cicero, but it is interesting to note that although not a Roman
(there is no evidence that he ever became a citizen, as instead Theophanes eventually
did, in turn adopting another Roman, Balbus of Gadara29), he was entrusted with a
subject involving Roman politics, and one very dear to its author’s heart


Posidonius and Roman imperialism

A further reason for Roman interest in Posidonius may have been his views on the
formation and ethics of empire. His involvement with this subject has sparked much
interest.30 As with the argument for the monograph above, I cannot give a complete
discussion of the topic here, as it is a particularly complex one, which relies on close
readings of the fragmentary sources, and inferences from Diodorus Siculus, who
probably used Posidonius’ works,31 but I shall give a résumé of the most salient points.

Firstly, it is clear that Posidonius had extensive contacts within Rome. He had
served as the Rhodian ambassador during the Marian and Sullan era, 32 became
acquainted with Pompey and Cicero, and may have had some contacts with the family
of the Marcelli, whom he often mentions.33 This would indicate that, like Polybius, he
was at ease in the upper echelons of Roman society. Although he came from Syria,34
he denigrated the local Syrians and the ruling Ptolemies, whom he saw as debauched
and inept,35 and supported Pompey, so he must have approved to a certain extent of
the order which Rome was striving to bring to the region.

Secondly, according to the Suda (see above), Posidonius’ Histories were a
deliberate continuation of Polybius. While Posidonius need not have adopted all of the
earlier writer’s views, this does suggest that he approved of Polybius’ main purpose,
namely, to recount the rise of Rome.36 He need not have been entirely blind to Rome’s
faults, even so; many of the fragments of his Histories castigate vice in almost
whimsical terms (although it may be relevant to note that all those named are non-
Romans),37 and if much of the work was written in such a satirical tone, it is possible
that he may have shown that Rome later abused her power, having striven so hard to
achieve it.

Thirdly, as a Stoic, Posidonius was the pupil of, and successor to, Panaetius.38
The latter had had contacts with the Scipiones, and as leader of a Stoic school on
Rhodes is credited with playing a major role in shaping the often anti-authoritarian,
‘cynical’ (in the philosophical sense) views of the earlier Stoics to fit the changed
conditions Greece experienced under Roman rule.39 While very little of his actual
works have survived,40 Cicero, by his own admission, followed Panaetius’ ethical
work Περὶ καθήκοντα very closely in his De Finibus, so it is evident that he taught
a form of Stoicism which was particularly well-suited to the needs of the Roman
statesman.41

Posidonius is closely associated with Panaetius, since as well as the simple
fact that he was his pupil, he also criticised and developed Panaetius’ views,42 for
example, extending his classification of the types of virtue (Diogenes Laertius VII.92
= EK F.180). Since Cicero’s views on the philosophical underpinning of empire were
heavily influenced by Panaetius, 43 I am sure that he would have been greatly
interested in Posidonius’ comments on Panaetius’ arguments. Although we must take
into account Cicero’s own outlook as a Roman politician and must be wary of
viewing his political works as mere translations of Greek originals, it is clear that
these writings did have a considerable impact on his thought.

In his extant writings, Posidonius appears to champion the rule of a strong
power over weaker subjects. While this seems alien to the normal position of the Stoa,
Strasburger and Capelle have emphasised that such rule was to be maintained through
goodwill;44 Imperialism was tolerable so long as the ruling state did not abuse its
powers. This outlook is illustrated by the fragment in which Posidonius describes how
the weak-minded Mariandynoi gave themselves up into the power of the Heracleots of
the Black Sea region because they recognised that both would benefit from such a
course of action.45 As one influenced by Aristotle’s doctrines,46 Posidonius may have
shared some of his views on so-called natural slavery. Strasburger has suggested that
Posidonius’ teaching influenced Pompey’s humane treatment of the captured pirates
in his wars against them,47 which is an attractive theory, although there is no definite
evidence with which to back it up, and Pompey’s lauded ‘humanity’ may simply have
been a much-praised piece of propaganda.

The overall picture of Posidonius’ relationship to Roman imperialism is one of
acceptance and compromise. We cannot say that he accepted it unconditionally; this
was a man who was stubborn enough on one occasion (perhaps c.62 BC) to treat
Pompey to a lecture on virtue when he would far rather have had praise for his recent
campaigns, 48 and whose propensities for irony have been noted above; yet he
recognised that Roman rule brought certain benefits and was content to coexist with
Romans, no doubt enjoying the honour which this brought him.

Notes:

17 Plutarch, Marius 45.7 = EK T.28 = F.255.
18 EK T.29-45.
19 Florus 1.41.8; see Kidd (1988a), 27-28.
20 E.g., Anderson (1963).
21 Kidd (1988a), 28.
22 Strabo XI.1.6 = EK F.79; see Kidd (1988a), 331-33.
23 Suda, s.v. Ποσειδώνιος 2108 = EK T.1a; s.v. Πολύβιος, Codex A, in marg. = EK T.1b.
24 Malitz (1983), 70; F. Jacoby (1926), Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (Berlin), vol. 2.a,
no.87.F.27 (hereafter cited as FrGH 87) = EK F.78.
25 Athenaeus VI.266e-f = EK F.51 (enslavement of the Chians by Mithridates, dateable to 86 BC; see
Kidd (1988a), 277-80.
26 Reinhardt (1953), cols. 630-41, esp. 638-39.
27 W. Aly (1957), Strabonis Geographica (Bonn), vol.4, 94ff; Malitz (1983), 71-73; W. Theiler (ed.)
(1982), Posidonius: Die Fragmente (Berlin), vol. 2, 59; Kidd (1988a), 331-33.
28 Cicero, Ad Att. II.1.2 (= SB 21.2) (60 BC) = EK T.34.
29 Gold (1985), 322-24.
30 See, e.g., Erskine (1990), F. Strasburger (1965), ‘Poseidonios on problems of the Roman empire’,
JRS 55: 40-53, W. Capelle (1932), ‘Griechische Ethik und römischer Imperialismus’, Klio 25: 86-113.
31 Reinhardt (1953), cols. 630-41.
32 Strabo VII.5.8 = EK T.27 (prytany); Plutarch, Marius 45.7 = EK T.28.
33 Suda, s.v. Ποσειδώνιος, 2107-10 = EK T.1a; F.86e = Hermias, in Platonis Phaedrum 114; Plutarch,
Marcellus 1.1-3, 9.4-7, 20.1-11, 30.6-9; Fab. Max. 19.1-4 = EK F.257-61.
34 EK T.1a-2b (and see references below)
35 See Athenaeus XIV.649d = EK F.54, VI.252e = EK F.56, XII.549d-e = EK F.58.
36 As expressed in Polybius, I.1 and elsewhere.
37 E.g., EK F.56 (Hierax); F.58 (Ptolemy VIII Physcon); F.59 (Damophilus); F.61a-b (Antiochus VII
Sidetes); F.253 (Athenion); F.257 (Marcellus and Nicias of Engyium).
38 Suda, s.v. Ποσειδώνιος, 2107 = EK T.1a; Cicero, De Div. 1.6 = EK T.10.
39 M. Pohlenz (1948), Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung (Göttingen), vol.1, 197.
40 For the remaining evidence see van Straaten (1962).
41 J. Rist (1969), Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge), ch.10; Pohlenz (1948), 194-257.
42 Association with Panaetius: Suda, s.v. Ποσειδώνιος, 2107 = EK T.1a; Athenaeus XII.549d-e = EK
T.7; Cicero, De Off. III.8 = EK T.9; De Div. I.6 = EK T.10; development of Panaetius’ views: EK
F.41c, T.10.
43 See, e.g. Cic., De Leg. III.14; De Div. I.6, II.88, 97; De Fin. I.6, IV.23, 79; De Off. I.7-10, 152, II.60.
44 Strasburger (1965), 34-37; Capelle (1932), 99, 103.
45 Athenaeus VI.263c-d = EK F.60. See Erskine (1990), 201f.
46 Sandbach (1985), esp. 59-62.
47 Strasburger (1965), 49-51.
48 Cicero, Tusc.Disp. II.61 = EK T.38 (see also T.35).

I thought all of this is quite remarkable, given the behavior of likes as Petraeus, Patton, MacArthur or Eisenhower -- to name just a few.
 
Laura said:
Indeed Posidonius pursued aetiology so relentlessly that he became known in antiquity as the Aetiologue. Not, of course, that science did not illustrate causes and offer explanations from observed factual evidence — indeed they could sometimes offer alternative possible explanations — but it was beyond their technological capacity to find ultimate causes or explanation. This was because their prime function was descriptive rather than explanatory, although such description and analysis could clarify immediate cause and effect. As such they are, in fact, for Posidonius the tools of philosophy (thus supplanting the earlier-held function of logic), and indeed necessary tools in working out the natural behaviour of phenomena. So the relationship between philosophy and science is complementary, and the attempt to work this out on such a cosmic scale is the most remarkable contribution of Posidonius. It is infuriating that because of our fractured evidence, and more particularly because of the limited interest and understanding of men like Strabo, who used his more scientific works, but disapproved of his deeper aetiological interests, that we are now lacking demonstration of how Posidonius actually operated on the borderline where for him philosophy and science met, in the limbo-land of hypotheses and the differentiation between different kinds of causes and explanations.

By a nice coincidence I read the following today in John Taylor Gatto's Underground History of American Education:

Codes Of Meaning
This unique moral chronicle (Christian code of right living) led to an everyday behavioral code which worked so well that in a matter of centuries it became the dominant perspective of Europe, and soon it made inroads into every belief system across the planet. But the sheer extent of its success caused it to run afoul of three other competing systems for producing meaning, each of which held common people in contempt or worse. These competing codes viewed Christianity antagonistically because of its power to liberate ordinary people from the bondage of fear and envy.
Those competing codes of meaning gave us formal schooling, public and private. The first competitor, the aristocratic code, comes out of pagan traditions. It is still the philosophy taught in upper-class boarding schools like Middlesex and Gunnery, and through home training and particular class institutions. Its operating principles are leadership, sportsmanship, courage, disdain for hardship, team play, self-sacrifice (for the team), and devotion to duty—as noble traditions define duty. The boardrooms of certain global corporations are one of the great preserves of this exclusive but universally attractive pagan attitude.
The second code in competition with Christianity was taken from the practice of great commercial civilizations like the Hanseatic League of medieval times or the society of Holland in the seventeenth century. This behavioral code makes security, comfort, health, and wealth the central purpose of life. The main thrust of this kind of seeking is radically anti-Christian, but the contradiction isn’t obvious when the two come into contact because commercial cultures emphasize peaceful coexistence, tolerance, cooperation, and pragmatism. They reject the value of pain, and take principled behavior with a grain of salt, everything being relative to security and prosperity. Pragmatism is the watchword.
The wealth that a commercial perspective delivers produced a dilemma for Puritan society to wrestle with, since the intense neo-Christianity of Puritanism was yoked to an equal intensity of business acumen, a talent for commercial transaction. In the Calvinist vein, this contradiction was resolved by declaring wealth a reliable sign of God’s favor, as poverty was a sign of His condemnation. Both pagan and mercantile ethical codes operated behind a facade of Christianity during the Christian era, weakening the gospel religion, while at the same time profiting from it and paying lip service to it. Proponents of these different frames called themselves Christians but did not live like Christians, rejecting certain tenets of Christianity we’ve just examined, those which interfered with personal gain. Yet in both cases, the life maps these competing theories tried to substitute were not, ultimately, satisfying enough to stop the spreading influence of Christian vision.
Stated more directly, these competing moral codes were unable to deliver sufficient tangible day-to-day meaning to compete against the religious prescription of a simple life, managed with dignity and love, and with acceptance of the demands of work, self-control, and moral choice, together with the inevitability of tragedy, aging, and death. Neither the pagan outlook nor the commercial philosophy was equal to overthrowing their unworldly rival. Because the commercial code lacked sufficient magic and mystery, and the aristocratic code, which had those things, froze out the majority from enjoying them, it fell to yet a third scheme for organizing meaning to eventually cause the major sabotage of spiritual life.
I refer to the form of practical magic we call Science. Kept rigorously and strictly subordinate to human needs, science is an undeniably valuable way to negotiate the physical world. But the human tendency has always been to break loose from these constraints and to try to explain the purpose of life. Instead of remaining merely a useful description of how things work, great synthesizing theories like Big Bang or Natural Selection purport to explain the origin of the universe or how life best progresses. Yet by their nature, these things are beyond proof or disproof. Few laymen understand that the synthesizing theories of Science are religious revelations in disguise.
In the years around the beginning of the twentieth century, the scientific outlook as a substitute religion took command of compulsion schools and began to work to eradicate any transcendental curriculum in school. This happened in stages. First was the passage of compulsion school legislation and invention of the factory school (isolated from family and community), appearing in conjunction with the extermination of the one-room school. That job had been largely accomplished by 1900. The second stage was introduction of hierarchical layers of school management and government selected and regulated teaching staff. That job was complete by 1930. The third stage comprised socialization of the school into a world of "classes" and de-individualized individuals who looked to school authorities for leadership instead of to their own parents and churches. This was accomplished by 1960. The fourth and last stage (so far) was the psychologizing of the classroom, a process begun full scale in 1960, which, with the advent of national standardized testing, outcomes-based education, Title I legislation, School-to-Work legislation, etc., was accelerating as the last century came to a close.
All these incremental changes are ambitious designs to control how children think, feel, and behave. There had been signs of this intention two centuries earlier, but without long-term confinement of children to great warehouses, the amount of isolation and mind-control needed to successfully introduce civil religion through schooling just wasn’t available.
 
The goal is to become a sage and the other two categories area philosophers and people who already think they are sages so they don't seek wisdom. it is said that G was missing some things do you think he made it to be a sage?

I t is said in stoicism that unpleasant emotions are because of a lack of judgement. Sounds familiar to the knowledge protects and ignorance endangers and I'm beginning to think the biggest danger is to ourselves.
 
laura said:
One of the other interesting things I found was that this line of philosophers seems to be one of the most important and unsung things going on back then, and were completely eclipsed by Plato who we know was thoroughly condemned by Hervey Cleckley's analysis.


Which book or writing of Cleckley condemns Plato? I want to make sure that I am on the same page and it has been a long time since I read Cleckley. Is it the introduction of Alcibiades in Symposium as referenced here from Mask Of Sanity ? - http://www.cassiopaea.com/cassiopaea/psychopaths_in_history.htm


Or, is there more that I am missing and need to go back and revisit? If so, which book? Thanks.
 
Daenerys said:
laura said:
One of the other interesting things I found was that this line of philosophers seems to be one of the most important and unsung things going on back then, and were completely eclipsed by Plato who we know was thoroughly condemned by Hervey Cleckley's analysis.


Which book or writing of Cleckley condemns Plato? I want to make sure that I am on the same page and it has been a long time since I read Cleckley. Is it the introduction of Alcibiades in Symposium as referenced here from Mask Of Sanity ? - http://www.cassiopaea.com/cassiopaea/psychopaths_in_history.htm


Or, is there more that I am missing and need to go back and revisit? If so, which book? Thanks.

Plato is reviewed in Caricature of Love discussed in this thread: http://cassiopaea.org/forum/index.php/topic,21284.0.html
 
SeekinTruth said:
Daenerys said:
laura said:
One of the other interesting things I found was that this line of philosophers seems to be one of the most important and unsung things going on back then, and were completely eclipsed by Plato who we know was thoroughly condemned by Hervey Cleckley's analysis.


Which book or writing of Cleckley condemns Plato? I want to make sure that I am on the same page and it has been a long time since I read Cleckley. Is it the introduction of Alcibiades in Symposium as referenced here from Mask Of Sanity ? - http://www.cassiopaea.com/cassiopaea/psychopaths_in_history.htm


Or, is there more that I am missing and need to go back and revisit? If so, which book? Thanks.

Plato is reviewed in Caricature of Love discussed in this thread: http://cassiopaea.org/forum/index.php/topic,21284.0.html


Thank you. I had forgotten this one.


Would it also be correct to say that Plato was also a synarchist?
 
Thought these mentions were of interest amongst many from the above, I.G. Kidd, that Laura brought to light.

I.G.Kidd said:
To Posidonius the relationship between science and philosophy was a major issue. He was quite clear that the sciences and arts were not a part of philosophy, even although their investigations might cover the same or similar ground. Thus both astronomy and natural philosophy studied celestial phenomena, historiography and moral philosophy studied human behaviour. The crucial difference, as he saw it, lay in that only philosophy could give first and final causes and explanation, which he considered its key function.
[…]
So the relationship between philosophy and science is complementary, and the attempt to work this out on such a cosmic scale is the most remarkable contribution of Posidonius


This was M.P. Halls (1928 STOAA) take on the stoic. He says noting else here on Posidonius.

P.Hall said:
The sect of the Stoics was founded by Zeno (340-265 B.C.), the Cittiean, who studied under Crates the
Cynic, from which sect the Stoics had their origin. Zeno was succeeded by Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Zeno
of Tarsis, Diogenes, Antipater, Panætius, and Posidonius. Most famous of the Roman Stoics are
Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. The Stoics were essentially pantheists, since they maintained that as
there is nothing better than the world, the world is God. Zeno declared that the reason of the world is
diffused throughout it as seed. Stoicism is a materialistic philosophy, enjoining voluntary resignation to
natural law. Chrysippus maintained that good and evil being contrary, both are necessary since each
sustains the other. The soul was regarded as a body distributed throughout the physical form and subject
to dissolution with it. Though some of the Stoics held that wisdom prolonged the existence of the soul,
actual immortality is not included in their tenets. The soul was said to be composed of eight parts: the
five senses, the generative power, the vocal power, and an eighth, or hegemonic, part. Nature was
defined as God mixed throughout the substance of the world. All things were looked upon as bodies
either corporeal or incorporeal.

Meekness marked the attitude of the Stoic philosopher. While Diogenes was delivering a discourse
against anger, one of his listeners spat contemptuously in his face. Receiving the insult with humility,
the great Stoic was moved to retort: "I am not angry, but am in doubt whether I ought to be so or not!"

He reflects to Pantheism (mentioned elsewhere in this & other threads) _https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pantheism snippets

Pantheism (All-is-God) is often associated with monism (All-is-One) and some have suggested that it logically implies determinism: in Einstein's words,[39] "the past, present, and future are an 'illusion'".

Hinduism

It is generally asserted that Hindu religious texts are the oldest known literature containing pantheistic ideas...

Taoism

In the tradition of its leading thinkers Lao Tzu and Zhuangzi, Taoism is comparable with Pantheism, as The Tao is always spoken of with profound religious reverence and respect, similar to the way that Pantheism discusses the "divinity" of the Universe...

Other religions

There are elements of pantheism in some forms of Christianity,[55][56][57] Buddhism, Sufism, Judaism, Gnosticism, Neopaganism, and Theosophy...
[...]

"Spiral image symbols favored by the World Pantheist Movement" (photo of spiral Universe & Seashell)
[..]

Albert Einstein's 1954 German letter in which he dismissed belief in a personal God...Einstein wrote, "We followers of Spinoza see our God in the wonderful order and lawfulness of all that exists and in its soul ("Beseeltheit") as it reveals itself in man and animal."
 
voyageur said:
(Quote from P. Hall)

Meekness marked the attitude of the Stoic philosopher. While Diogenes was delivering a discourse against anger, one of his listeners spat contemptuously in his face. Receiving the insult with humility, the great Stoic was moved to retort: "I am not angry, but am in doubt whether I ought to be so or not!"

Just some thoughts on this. Regarding this meekness I think this pertains more to not holding inner accounts against people (i.e, resentment) and allowing negative emotions to drive the thinking processes. But this doesn't necessarily mean being passively 'meek' (at least as the term is commonly understood) outwardly when the specific situation might require (for example) one to physically defend oneself or even to get angry (if necessary) in certain situations.

I think 'meek' is all about what's going on in the inside, being able to look at the situation more as it is, closer to the way the universe sees it. I think it's being able to see mechanical behavior (as in the case with Diogenes) for what it is as it's manifesting and holding this realization in one's awareness and knowing this to be true while still in the heat of the battle (so to speak).

The understanding from this will keep one inwardly calm and centered and instead of feeling resentful and angry one just 'sees' the situation and the inner dynamics within the situation in closer alignment with how the universe sees it. But outwardly, depending on the specific situation, one may have to respond to the situation in many different ways all depending on what is the best way to respond in that particular situation. One can be meek internally (in the way I described above) while not necessarily having to appear meek on the outside. It all depends on the specific situation of course and what is best to make things easiest for the other person and ourselves. But for this a great control of the body, the emotions, and the the mind are essential. So one can be 'meek' but I think its about being able to be meek in the right way.
 
kenlee said:
It all depends on the specific situation of course and what is best to make things easiest for the other person and ourselves. But for this a great control of the body, the emotions, and the the mind are essential. So one can be 'meek' but I think its about being able to be meek in the right way.

Think this is so. Seems external considering first, a measure of the specifics, the environment of a given situation with its many influences, choosing the right way; not so easy all the time. Seems when immediately pressed (as it exists often today), there is little mastery of balancing; it is often automated/mechanically programmed instead of coming from understanding of many natures. Perhaps like a practiced martial arts master of old, they have seen a thousand immediate threats and moves, and must choose correctly a response that serves both, given specifics, in the best way possible.
 
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