From the book "Blink" by Malcolm Gladwell
Introduction The Statue That Didn't Look Right
In September of 1983, an art dealer by the name of Gianfranco Becchina
approached the J. Paul Getty Museum in California. He had in his
possession, he said, a marble statue dating from the sixth century BC. It
was what is known as a kouros - a sculpture of a nude male youth standing
with his left leg forward and his arms at his sides. There are only about
two hundred kouroi in existence, and most have been recovered badly damaged
or in fragments from grave sites or archeological digs. But this one was
almost perfectly preserved. It stood close to seven feet tall. It had a
kind of light-colored glow that set it apart from other ancient works. It
was an extraordinary find. Becchina's asking price was just under $10
million.
The Getty moved cautiously. It took the kouros on loan and began a
thorough investigation. Was the statue consistent with other known kouroi?
The answer appeared to be yes. The style of the sculpture seemed
reminiscent of the Anavyssos kouros in the National Archaeological Museum
of Athens, meaning that it seemed to fit with a particular time and place.
Where and when had the statue been found? No one knew precisely, but
Becchina gave the Getty's legal department a sheaf of documents relating to
its more recent history. The kouros, the records stated, had been in the
private collection of a Swiss physician named Lauffenberger since the
1935, and he in turn had acquired it from a well- known Greek art dealer
named Roussos.
A geologist from the University of California named Stanley Margolis
came to the museum and spent two days examining the surface of the statue
with a high-resolution stereomicroscope. He then removed a core sample
measuring one centimeter in diameter and two centimeters in length from
just below the right knee and analyzed it using an electron microscope,
electron microprobe, mass spectrometry, X-ray diffraction, and X-ray
fluorescence. The statue was made of dolomite marble from the ancient Cape
Vathy quarry on the island of Thasos, Margolis concluded, and the surface
of the statue was covered in a thin layer of calcite - which was
significant, Margolis told the Getty, because dolomite can turn into
calcite only over the course of hundreds, if not thousands, of years. In
other words, the statue was old. It wasn't some contemporary fake.
The Getty was satisfied. Fourteen months after their investigation of
the kouros began, they agreed to buy the statue. In the fall of 1986, it
went on display for the first time. The New York Times marked the occasion
with a front-page story. A few months later, the Getty's curator of
antiquities, Marion True, wrote a long, glowing account of the museum's
acquisition for the art journal The Burlington Magazine. "Now standing
erect without external support, his closed hands fixed firmly to his thighs,
the kouros expresses the confident vitality that is characteristic of his
brothers." True concluded triumphantly, "God or man, he embodies all the
radiant energy of the adolescence of western art."
The kouros, however, had a problem. It didn't look right. The first to
point this out was an Italian art historian named Federico Zeri, who served
on the Getty's board of trustees. When Zeri was taken down to the museum's
restoration studio to see the kouros in December of 1983, he found himself
staring at the sculpture's fingernails. In a way he couldn't immediately
articulate, they seemed wrong to him.
Evelyn Harrison was next. She was one
of the world's foremost experts on Greek sculpture, and she was in Los
Angeles visiting the Getty just before the museum finalized the deal with
Becchina. "Arthur Houghton, who was then the curator, took us down to see
it," Harrison remembers. "He just swished a cloth off the top of it and
said, `Well, it isn't ours yet, but it will be in a couple of weeks.' And I
said, `I'm sorry to hear that.'"
What did Harrison see? She didn't know.
In that very first moment, when Houghton swished off the cloth, all
Harrison had was a hunch, an instinctive sense that something was amiss. A
few months later, Houghton took Thomas Hoving, the former director of the
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, down to the Getty's conservation
studio to see the statue as well. Hoving always makes a note of the first
word that goes through his head when he sees something new, and he'll
never forget what that word was when he first saw the kouros. "It was
`fresh' - `fresh," Hoving recalls. And "fresh" was not the right reaction
to have to a two-thousand-year-old statue. Later, thinking back on that
moment, Hoving realized why that thought had popped into his mind: "I had
dug in Sicily, where we found bits and pieces of these things. They just
don't come out looking like that. The kouros looked like it had been
dipped in the very best caffe latte from Starbucks." Roving turned to
Houghton. "Have you paid for this?" Houghton, Roving remembers, looked
stunned. "If you have, try to get your money back," Roving said. "If
you haven't, don't."
The Getty was getting worried, so they convened a special symposium on
the kouros in Greece. They wrapped the statue up, shipped it to Athens, and
invited the country's most senior sculpture experts. This time the chorus
of dismay was even louder.
Harrison, at one point, was standing next to a man named George
Despinis, the head of the Acropolis Museum in Athens. He took one look at
the kouros and blanched. "Anyone who has ever seen a sculpture coming out
of the ground," he said to her, "could tell that that thing has never been
in the ground." Georgios Dontas, head of the Archeological Society in
Athens, saw the statue and immediately felt cold. "When I saw the kouros
for the first time," he said, "I felt as though there was a glass between
me and the work." Dontas was followed in the symposium by Angelos
Delivorrias, director of the Benaki Museum in Athens. He spoke at length on
the contradiction between the style of the sculpture and the fact that the
marble from which it was carved came from Thasos. Then he got to the point.
Why did he think it was a fake? Because when he first laid eyes on it, he
said, he felt a wave of "intuitive repulsion." By the time the symposium was
over, the consensus among many of the attendees appeared to be that the
kouros was not at all what it was supposed to be. The Getty, with its
lawyers and scientists and months of painstaking investigation, had come
to one conclusion, and some of the world's foremost experts in Greek
sculpture - just by looking at the statue and sensing their own "intuitive
repulsion" - had come to another. Who was right?
For a time it wasn't clear. The kouros was the kind of thing that art
experts argued about at conferences. But then, bit by bit, the Getty's case
began to fall apart. The letters the Getty's lawyers used to carefully
trace the kouros back to the Swiss physician Lauffenberger, for in-stance,
turned out to be fakes. One of the letters dated 1952 had a postal code on
it that didn't exist until twenty years later. Another letter dated 1955
referred to a bank account that wasn't opened until 1963. Origin ally the
conclusion of long months of research was that the Getty kouros was in the
style of the Anavyssos kouros. But that, too, fell into doubt: the closer
experts in Greek sculpture looked at it, the more they began to see it as a
puzzling pastiche of several different styles from several different places
and time periods. The young man's slender proportions looked a lot like
those of the Tenea kouros, which is in a museum in Munich, and his
stylized, beaded hair was a lot like that of the kouros in the Metropolitan
Museum in New York. His feet, meanwhile, were, if anything, modern. The
kouros it most resembled, it turned out, was a smaller, fragmentary statue
that was found by a British art historian in Switzerland in 1990. The two
statues were cut from similar marble and sculpted in quite similar ways.
But the Swiss kouros didn't come from ancient Greece. It came from a
forger's workshop in Rome in the early 1980s. And what of the scientific
analysis that said that the surface of the Getty kouros could only have
aged over many hundreds or thousands of years? Well, it turns out things
weren't that cut and dried. Upon further analysis, another geologist
concluded that it might be possible to "age" the surface of a dolomite
marble statue in a couple of months using potato mold. In the Getty's
catalogue, there is a picture of the kouros, with the notation "About 530
BC, or modern forgery."
When Federico Zeri and Evelyn Harrison and Thomas Hoving and Georgios
Dontas - and all the others - looked at the kouros and felt an "intuitive
repulsion," they were absolutely right. In the first two seconds of looking
- in a single glance - they were able to under-stand more about the
essence of the statue than the team at the Getty was able to understand
after fourteen months. Blink is a book about those first two seconds.
Fast and Frugal
Imagine that I were to ask you to play a very simple gambling game. In front
of you are four decks of cards - two of them red and the other two blue.
Each card in those four decks either wins you a sum of money or costs you
some money, and your job is to turn over cards from any of the decks, one
at a time, in such a way that maximizes your winnings. What you don't know
at the beginning, however, is that the red decks are a minefield. The
rewards are high, but when you lose on the red cards, you lose a lot.
Actually, you can win only by taking cards from the blue decks, which offer
a nice steady diet of $5o payouts and modest penalties. The question is how
long will it take you to figure this out?
A group of scientists at the University of Iowa did this experiment a
few years ago, and what they found is that after we've turned over about
fifty cards, most of us start to develop a hunch about what's going on. We
don't know why we prefer the blue decks, but we're pretty sure at that
point that they are a better bet. After turning over about eighty cards,
most of us have figured out the game and can explain exactly why the first
two decks are such a bad idea. That much is straightforward. We have some
experiences. We think them through. We develop a theory. And then finally
we put two and two together. That's the way learning works.
But the Iowa scientists did something else, and this is where the
strange part of the experiment begins. They hooked each gambler up to a
machine that measured the activity of the sweat glands below the skin in
the palms of their hands. Like most of our sweat glands, those in our
palms respond to stress as well as temperature - which is why we get clammy
hands when we are nervous. What the Iowa scientists found is that gamblers
started generating stress responses to the red decks by the tenth card,
forty cards before they were able to say that they had a hunch about what
was wrong with those two decks. More important, right around the time their
palms started sweating, their behavior began to change as well. They
started favoring the blue cards and taking fewer and fewer cards from the
red decks. In other words, the gamblers figured the game out before they
realized they had figured the game out: they began making the necessary
adjustments long before they were consciously aware of what adjustments
they were supposed to be making.
The Iowa experiment is just that, of course, a simple card game involving a
handful of subjects and a stress detector. But it's a very powerful
illustration of the way our minds work. Here is a situation where the
stakes were high, where things were moving quickly, and where the
participants had to make sense of a lot of new and confusing information in
a very short time. What does the Iowa experiment tell us? That in those
moments, our brain uses two very different strategies to make sense of the
situation. The first is the one we're most familiar with. It's the
conscious strategy. We think about what we've learned, and eventually we
come up with an answer. This strategy is logical and definitive. But it
takes us eighty cards to get there. It's slow, and it needs a lot of
information. There's a second strategy, though. It operates a lot more
quickly. It starts to kick in after ten cards, and it's really smart,
because it picks up the problem with the red decks almost immediately. It
has the drawback, however, that it operates - at least at first - entirely
below the surface of consciousness. It sends its messages through weirdly
indirect channels, such as the sweat glands in the palms of our hands. It's
a system in which our brain reaches conclusions without immediately
telling us that it's reaching conclusions.
The second strategy was the path taken by Evelyn Harrison and Thomas
Hoving and the Greek scholars. They didn't weigh every conceivable strand
of evidence. They considered only what could be gathered in a glance. Their
thinking was what the cognitive psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer likes to call
"fast and frugal." They simply took a look at that statue and some part of
their brain did a series of instant calculations, and before any kind of
conscious thought took place, they felt something, just like the sudden
prickling of sweat on the palms of the gamblers. For Thomas Hoving, it was
the completely in- appropriate word "fresh" that suddenly popped into his
head. In the case of Angelos Delivorrias, it was a wave of "intuitive
repulsion." For Georgios Dontas, it was the feeling that there was a glass
between him and the work. Did they know why they knew? Not at all. But they
knew.
The Internal Computer
The part of our brain that leaps to conclusions like this is called the
adaptive unconscious, and the study of this kind of decision making is one
of the most important new fields in psychology. The adaptive unconscious is
not to be con- fused with the unconscious described by Sigmund Freud, which
was a dark and murky place filled with desires and memories and fantasies
that were too disturbing for us to think about consciously. This new notion
of the adaptive unconscious is thought of, instead, as a kind of giant
computer that quickly and quietly processes a lot of the data we need in
order to keep functioning as human beings. When you walk out into the
street and suddenly realize that a truck is bearing down on you, do you
have time to think through all your options? Of course not. The only way
that human beings could ever have survived as a species for as long as we
have is that we've developed another kind of decision-making apparatus
that's capable of making very quick judgments based on very little
information. As the psychologist Timothy D. Wilson writes in his book
Strangers to Ourselves: "The mind operates most efficiently by relegating a
good deal of high-level, sophisticated thinking to the unconscious, just as
a modern jetliner is able to fly on automatic pilot with little or no
input from the human, `conscious' pilot. The adaptive un- conscious does an
excellent job of sizing up the world, warning people of danger, setting
goals, and initiating action in a sophisticated and efficient manner."
Wilson says that we toggle back and forth between our conscious and
unconscious modes of thinking, depending on the situation. A decision to
invite a co-worker over for dinner is conscious. You think it over. You
decide it will be fun. You ask him or her. The spontaneous decision to
argue with that same co-worker is made unconsciously - by a different part
of the brain and motivated by a different part of your personality.
Whenever we meet someone for the first time, when- ever we interview
someone for a job, whenever we react to a new idea, whenever we're faced
with making a decision quickly and under stress, we use that second part of
our brain. How long, for example, did it take you, when you were in
college, to decide how good a teacher your professor was? A class? Two
classes? A semester? The psychologist Nalini Ambady once gave students three
ten-second videotapes of a teacher - with the sound turned off - and found
they had no difficulty at all coming up with a rating of the teacher's
effectiveness. Then Ambady cut the clips back to five seconds, and the
ratings were the same. They were remarkably consistent even when she showed
the students just two seconds of videotape. Then Ambady compared those snap
judgments of teacher effectiveness with evaluations of those same
professors made by their students after a full semester of classes, and she
found that they were also essentially the same. A person watching a silent
two-second video clip of a teacher he or she has never met will reach
conclusions about how good that teacher is that are very similar to those
of a student who has sat in the teacher's class for an entire semester.
That's the power of our adaptive unconscious.
You may have done the same thing, whether you realized it or not, when
you first picked up this book. How long did you first hold it in your
hands? Two seconds? And yet in that short space of time, the design of the
cover, whatever associations you may have with my name, and the first few
sentences about the kouros all generated an impression - a flurry of
thoughts and images and preconceptions - that has fundamentally shaped the
way you have read this introduction so far. Aren't you curious about what
happened in those two seconds?
I think we are innately suspicious of this kind of rapid cognition. We
live in a world that assumes that the quality of a decision is directly
related to the time and effort that went into making it. When doctors are
faced with a difficult diagnosis, they order more tests, and when we are un-
certain about what we hear, we ask for a second opinion. And what do we
tell our children? Haste makes waste. Look before you leap. Stop and think.
Don't judge a book by its cover. We believe that we are always better off
gathering as much information as possible and spending as much time as
possible in deliberation. We really only trust conscious decision making.
But there are moments, particularly in times of stress, when haste does not
make waste, when our snap judgments and first impressions can offer a much
better means of making sense of the world. The first task of Blink is to
convince you of a simple fact: decisions made very quickly can be every bit
as good as decisions made cautiously and deliberately.
Blink is not just a celebration of the power of the glance, however.
I'm also interested in those moments when our instincts betray us. Why, for
instance, if the Getty's kouros was so obviously fake - or, at least,
problematic - did the museum buy it in the first place? Why didn't the
experts at the Getty also have a feeling of intuitive repulsion during the
fourteen months they were studying the piece? That's the great puzzle of
what happened at the Getty, and the answer is that those feelings, for one
reason or another, were thwarted. That is partly because the scientific
data seemed so compelling. (The geologist Stanley Margolis was so convinced
by his own analysis that he published a long account of his method in
Scientific American.) But mostly it's because the Getty desperately wanted
the statue to be real. It was a young museum, eager to build a world-class
collection, and the kouros was such an extraordinary find that its experts
were blinded to their instincts. The art historian George Ortiz was once
asked by Ernst Langlotz, one of the world's foremost experts on archaic
sculpture, whether he wanted to purchase a bronze statuette. Ortiz went to
see the piece and was taken aback; it was, to his mind, clearly a fake,
full of contradictory and slipshod elements. So why was Langlotz, who knew
as much as anyone in the world about Greek statues, fooled? Ortiz's
explanation is that Langlotz had bought the sculpture as a very young man,
before he acquired much of his formidable expertise. "I suppose," Ortiz
said, "that Langlotz fell in love with this piece; when you are a young
man, you do fall in love with your first purchase, and perhaps this was his
first love. Notwithstanding his unbelievable knowledge, he was obviously
unable to question his first assessment."
That is not a fanciful explanation. It gets at something fundamental about
the way we think. Our unconscious is a powerful force. But it's fallible.
It's not the case that our internal computer always shines through,
instantly decoding the "truth" of a situation. It can be thrown off,
distracted, and disabled. Our instinctive reactions often have to compete
with all kinds of other interests and emotions and sentiments. So, when
should we trust our instincts, and when should we be wary of them?
Answering that question is the second task of Blink. When our powers of
rapid cognition go awry, they go awry for a very specific and consistent
set of reasons, and those reasons can be identified and under- stood. It is
possible to learn when to listen to that powerful onboard computer and when
to be wary of it.
The third and most important task of this book is to convince you that our
snap judgments and first impressions can be educated and controlled. I know
that's hard to believe. Harrison and Hoving and the other art experts who
looked at the Getty kouros had powerful and sophisticated reactions to the
statue, but didn't they bubble up unbidden from their unconscious? Can that
kind of mysterious reaction be controlled? The truth is that it can. Just
as we can teach ourselves to think logically and deliberately, we can
also teach ourselves to make better snap judgments. In Blink you'll meet
doctors and generals and coaches and furniture designers and musicians and
actors and car salesmen and countless others, all of whom are very good at
what they do and all of whom owe their success, at least in part, to the
steps they have taken to shape and manage and educate their unconscious
reactions. The power of knowing, in that first two seconds, is not a gift
given magically to a fortunate few. It is an ability that we can all
cultivate for ourselves.
A Different and Better World
There are lots of books that tackle broad themes, that analyze the world
from great remove. This is not one of them. Blink is concerned with the
very smallest components of our everyday lives - the content and origin of
those instantaneous impressions and conclusions that spontaneously arise
whenever we meet a new person or confront a complex situation or have to
make a decision under conditions of stress. When it comes to the task of
understanding ourselves and our world, I think we pay too much attention to
those grand themes and too little to the particulars of those fleeting
moments. But what would happen if we took our instincts seriously? What if
we stopped scanning the horizon with our binoculars and began instead
examining our own decision making and behavior through the most powerful of
microscopes? I think that would change the way wars are fought, the kinds
of products we see on the shelves, the kinds of movies that get made, the
way police officers are trained, the way couples are counseled, the way job
interviews are conducted, and on and on. And if we were to combine all of
those little changes, we would end up with a different and better world. I
believe - and I hope that by the end of this book you will believe it as
well - that the task of making sense of ourselves and our behavior requires
that we acknowledge there can be as much value in the blink of an eye as in
months of rational analysis. "I always considered scientific opinion more
objective than esthetic judgments," the Getty's curator of antiquities
Marion True said when the truth about the kouros finally emerged. "Now I
realize I was wrong.
