China Spying: Australian Businessman Allegedly Received Envelopes of Cash for Info Including Nuclear Submarines

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I came across an article on Breitbart Europe about an Australian businessman who allegedly received envelopes of cash from Chinese spies in exchange for information, including details on nuclear submarines.

What doesn’t make sense is why the businessman, who was not employed by any Australian government agency before, would have had any valuable intelligence to offer. It’s claimed that he was approached on social media by individuals named Ken and Evelyn, who offered him money for information. The article did not provide any idea on how the situation was uncovered by Australian authorities, so leads me to be suspicions that it could have been a political setup.

While the businessman may have been naive to engage with the spies, perhaps they just went fishing for a patsy and eventually found one, unfortunately for him.
 
so leads me to be suspicions that it could have been a political setup.
Looks like it:


The Guardian said:
[..]
Csergo’s lawyer, the prominent barrister Bernard Collaery, cast the reports as anything but sinister.

He launched a wide-scale attack on the prosecution, suggesting the publicity of the charge and “shallow” case had ruined the consultant’s career.

He cast his client as an extremely experienced, successful businessman who was encouraged and lauded for developing working relationships in China, only to watch the Australian government pass laws in 2018 outlawing reckless foreign interference.

“Businesspeople such as our client know all roads lead to the state, whether it be the state economic intelligence agency or [the Ministry of State Security],” Collaery said.

“Cash payments for consulting reports might have a colour to it in Australia but might be the way it’s done in China - it’s not necessarily sinister.”

Collaery said all work was publicly sourced documents, plus Csergo’s own creative efforts, and was nothing close to espionage.

But Csergo had liaised covertly with two other individuals in preparing the reports, McCraith said.

Magistrate Michael Barko stressed the “very well-educated, sophisticated, worldly businessperson” was entitled to the presumption of innocence.

But he faced a very strong prosecution case, including several substantial admissions, the court heard.

Csergo told Asio investigators he met Ken and Evelyn in empty cafes in Shanghai, believed the cafes had been specially cleared for him and believed China’s spy agency had assigned him “handlers”, the court heard.

“I don’t know what they do in China but in this country, if I were to read those facts to any layperson, they would be highly suspicious of the conduct of the defendant, at the very least,” Barko said.

Bail was denied. Csergo is due back in court in June.
Sounds like the guy got nervous and tried to tell ASIO what he thought they wanted to hear, not realising they would happily throw him under the bus.
 
Looks like it:


Sounds like the guy got nervous and tried to tell ASIO what he thought they wanted to hear, not realising they would happily throw him under the bus.

Yeah that’s likely too. I suppose I thought what if Australian intelligence went on a fishing expedition, with some fake Chinese spies, to entrap people like him working in and out of China?
 
Yeah that’s likely too. I suppose I thought what if Australian intelligence went on a fishing expedition, with some fake Chinese spies, to entrap people like him working in and out of China?
It's possible, although with ASIO involvement that suggests a domestic focus. ASIO is technically forbidden from operating outside of Australia, however the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) does conduct operations internationally. ASIS activities are rarely mentioned in the media though.
 
It's possible, although with ASIO involvement that suggests a domestic focus. ASIO is technically forbidden from operating outside of Australia, however the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) does conduct operations internationally. ASIS activities are rarely mentioned in the media though.

I guess what makes it strange is the guy works in marketing basically, never worked for government agencies, doesn’t have security clearances, wouldn’t likely get any because he worked in China, so unlikely has anything of value to provide Chinese intelligence from his past or future. At best they’ll get commercial information, which they’ll get easily without all the cloak and dagger. Even if he had connections to others who actually had valuable intelligence, it’s unlikely they’d spill the beans to somebody in marketing. So the story just has lots of holes. But I could be just operating in my overactive conspiracy pattern recognition mindset!
 
So the story just has lots of holes.
Yup. Why would he continue to associate with them for two years if he thought they were spies? It's starting to look like they were just harmless business contacts and ASIO decided to haul him in for questioning as part of a fishing expedition:


Pearls and Irritations Blog said:

Anti-China witch hunt intensifies with Csergo arrest​

By Paul Malone
Apr 20, 2023

In the Csergo case the big question is: does the prosecution have any evidence of a real crime and not just a breach of the ridiculous Reckless Foreign Interference law?

How dangerous is it to meet a couple of foreigners and have a private cup of coffee?

Can you quickly turn to your phone, do a Google search, and answer a question that the foreigners have posed?

Suppose they ask you if you know of any companies mining for lithium in Australia that might be worth investing in? Or whether the iron ore price is likely to hold up?

What if, knowing that you are a business consultant, or a journalist, they offer you a sum of money to write a paper on key matters of interest for their business dealings? The paper would, of course, be expected to include sources supporting your opinions, conclusions and recommendations.

If you do provide this paper, let me warn you, you might be in breach of Section 92.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 and the Offence of Reckless Foreign Interference.

And here’s another question: does it make any difference if your coffee shop acquaintances are American or Chinese?

This is an easy one. I can help you here: you bet it does.


Americans may be every bit as self-interested as the Chinese and may be dragging us into one catastrophic war after another, but our intelligence agencies won’t prosecute you under Section 92.3 of the Criminal Code Act even if you pass on Australian state secrets to them.

At this point in time we don’t know the full details of the prosecution case against businessman Alexander Csergo. What we do know is that he is accused of engaging in reckless conduct that would either support intelligence activities of a foreign principal, or prejudice Australia’s national security.

Solicitor Conor McCraith, for the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions said Mr Csergo had returned to Australia from China with a “shopping list” of matters pertaining to Australia’s national security interests, and the defendant failed to notify authorities, as a reasonable person would have.

Defence barrister Bernard Collaery told the court the various documents which his client used were “largely from open-source documents.” He said both ASIO and the AFP had “gone right through his laptop” and WeChat messages, and confirmed all the work was from publicly available material.

We also know that this case is a continuation of an anti-Chinese campaign that previous Coalition governments drove. Sadly Labor leaders did not have the backbone to stand up and resist the crusade.

This showcase arrest of Mr Csergo has echoes of the raid on the home and parliamentary offices of former state Labor backbencher Shaoquett Moselmane in June 2020.

At the time, the Australian Federal Police said they were seeking information relating to allegations of a foreign influence plot. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) was heavily involved in the Moselmane raid.

The raid was given widespread publicity and damaged Mr Moselmane’s reputation. He was suspended from the Australian Labor Party, only being reinstated in November 2020 when it became clear that he had no case to answer.

The Coalition’s anti-Chinese campaign has also had unintended consequences. Under the ludicrous requirements of the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act, former cabinet ministers were required to register any activity undertaken ‘on behalf of’ a foreign principal.

Many did so.

But one, former Labor Foreign minister and Attorney General Gareth Evans, rightly responded to a request to register with a curt letter saying he regarded the communication as a joke, albeit one in very poor taste.

Nine others registered. Three former prime ministers, Abbott, Turnbull and Rudd, two one-time would-be prime ministers Nelson and Downer and four ordinary ex-cabinet ministers Bolkus, Alston, Hill and Crean came out.

Turnbull revealed that he gave the keynote address to the Korean Jeju Forum in May 2019 and another speech at the Taiwan Yushan Forum in October 2020. Both speeches were hardly secret at the time of delivery and both are publicly available on the web.

Like Evans, Rudd responded to a request to register with a blunt letter to the department. As a former prime minister Rudd had given interviews to government owned media outlets such as the BBC, Radio NZ and Chinese state-owned media. His letter, posted on the register website, said his lawyer’s advice was that he had nothing to register. “I am not an agent of foreign influence and any such suggestion is forcefully rejected. I engage internationally as an individual, a scholar, a commentator, a former leader and in my roles with non-government and UN-affiliated institutions – never as an agent on behalf of any foreign government.”

In the anti-China campaign, the kids’ short video platform, Tik Tok, has also become a target.

But as Tik Tok was targeted, the real breaches of US national security were occurring right under the noses of US authorities on the US-owned Discord. As the Washington Post has pointed out, in the two weeks after US lawmakers harangued the CEO of TikTok, classified documents were making their way into public view, not as a result of any foreign adversary’s sinister plot, but via Jack Teixeira, a young member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, using Discord. The leaked material was then passed on via U.S.-owned Twitter!
 
Yup. Why would he continue to associate with them for two years if he thought they were spies? It's starting to look like they were just harmless business contacts and ASIO decided to haul him in for questioning as part of a fishing expedition:


True. I’m a little doubtful they’re direct Chinese intelligence or agents, they could be harmless business contacts too. Perhaps even agents of Australian intelligence. Who knows for sure? Whatever the case, looks like Csergo was fall guy to support a narrative. The wider question for me is how far back was that narrative design in effect?
 
With some guided prompts, I asked chatGPT to generate an opinion-based piece about what was raised above. It was a fairly balanced perspective I thought and got me thinking more that the official story is weak.

Anyway, here’s what it came back with:

China has been making strides in recent years in technology, industry, and military capabilities, and it has shown a growing interest in international affairs, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. Given its strategic interests, it is not surprising that China would be interested in gathering intelligence on other countries' military capabilities. But the recent allegations that Chinese spies were paying an Australian businessman for information on nuclear submarines have raised eyebrows and sparked speculation.

The businessman in question is Alexander Csergo, an Australian strategic consultant, who allegedly received envelopes of cash from suspected Chinese spies in exchange for information. Csergo's defense team argues that cash payments for consulting reports might be the way things are done in China and were not necessarily sinister. If that were the case, it would be hard to imagine why anyone would ever do business with China.

However, it is hard to imagine why Chinese intelligence agencies would need to resort to paying a foreign consultant to gather intelligence on Australian military capabilities. China has a large intelligence apparatus, and it is unlikely that they would need to rely on a foreign consultant like Csergo to obtain information.

One possible explanation is that Csergo's alleged contacts with Chinese spies were not actually Chinese intelligence operatives. It is possible that Csergo was interacting with individuals who were freelance consultants or even scam artists seeking to obtain information for personal gain. If that were the case, it would not be surprising that the Chinese government had no involvement in Csergo's activities.

Another reason why it is unlikely that Chinese intelligence agencies would be interested in Csergo's activities is that China is known for being very careful and strategic in its intelligence-gathering efforts. It is unlikely that they would risk exposure by involving a foreign consultant like Csergo.

In fact, one could argue that the Chinese government would be more likely to obtain intelligence through more subtle means, such as cyberattacks, espionage, or cultivating sources of information within Australia. As the saying goes, why buy the cow when you can get the milk for free?

Of course, we cannot say for sure whether or not Csergo was involved in espionage activities, but history has shown us that such tactics are not unheard of. In the United States, for example, the FBI has a long history of using undercover agents to entrap individuals suspected of criminal activity. And in the UK, the police have been known to use similar tactics in their efforts to crack down on terrorism.

But regardless of whether or not Csergo was caught up in a fishing expedition, the allegations against him have further strained the already delicate relationship between Australia and China. The Australian government has taken a harder line on China in recent years, which has led to retaliatory measures from Beijing. These include tariffs on Australian goods and restrictions on Australian wine and beef.

The tensions between these two nations are likely to remain high for the foreseeable future. It remains to be seen what the outcome of this case will be, but one thing is certain: the allegations against Csergo are serious and could have significant implications for Australia's national security. It is crucial that the Australian government continues to investigate this matter thoroughly and takes appropriate action if necessary. At the same time, it is essential to avoid escalating tensions with China unnecessarily and to continue engaging with the country in a constructive and pragmatic manner.
 
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