Putin Recognizes Donbass Republics, Sends Russian Military to 'Denazify' Ukraine

In the West the politicians and media have been running the story that Russia is losing the war when in reality they are winning. The story is out of desperation Russia will do something reckless e.g. chemical attack or tactical nuke etc.

The above can't help but make you wonder whether a hot war between Russia and NATO (or group of NATO affiliated countries e.g. Poland, Baltic States etc) will not be inevitable because the western politicians won't want their society to witness a Russian victory?

The question then becomes: under what conditions could a hot war take place that then doesn't become nuclear?
 
Germany is slowly waking up to the new reality.

Germany: “When this war is over, we will have to go back to dealing with Russia. We always do,”

“You can’t isolate a country like Russia in the long run, neither politically nor economically. German industry needs the raw materials that Russia has. It’s not just oil and gas, it’s also rare earths. And these are raw materials that cannot simply be substituted.” — says former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder.
 

WAR IN UKRAINE DAY 59: POSITIONAL BATTLES ON FRONT LINES AND MISSILE RAIN OVER UKRAINE​

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War In Ukraine Day 59: Positional Battles On Front Lines And Missile Rain Over Ukraine
Illustrative Image
The recent days of hostilities in Ukraine were not marked by any significant advances by any of the warring sides. Fierce fighting continues on the Donbass front lines, while Russian missiles are constantly destroying Ukrainian military equipment in different regions.
On April 21, the Russian Defense Minister told President Vladimir Putin that Mariupol is “liberated” and the remnants of Ukrainian nationalist formations are hiding in the Azovstal industrial area. In response, President said that it is needed to avoid a direct storm of this fortified area. He ordered to block it and once again propose fighters remaining there to surrender. So far, Azov militants did not use their chance to leave the Azovstal facilities. They also did not let civilians who are reportedly taken hostage in the basements there to leave the area of Azovstal. At the same time, Azov fighters continue to call on the international community to save their lives and secure their evacuation.

On April 23, Ukrainian and DPR authorities reportedly agreed to secure another humanitarian corridor to evacuate civilians to the territory controlled by Kiev, at the request of Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Irina Vereshchuk. However, the humanitarian attempt was thwarted.
“This peaceful action was disrupted by Ukrainian nationalists who opened mortar fire from the territory of the Azovstal plant at the announced gathering place of citizens near the Port City shopping center on Shevchenko Boulevard,” the head of the DPR Basurin said.
He noted that the citizens managed to get out of the dangerous area. As a result, one soldier was wounded.
in general, the city of Mariupol is secured, only the territory of the Azovstal plant is subjected to artillery strikes. Attempts by individual groups to attack from Azovstal are suppressed. DPR and Russian assault groups took control over a significant part of the facility.
“Somalia” battalion of the DPR returns to Donetsk from Mariupol:

In the area of Izyum, fierce clashes continue. Ukrainian artillery continues shelling on the town’s outskirts. Despite the attacks, acting Mayor of Izyum together with activists of the humanitarian organization “Peace to Kharkiv” raised the Russian flag in front of the city administration building.

In the area of Izyum, on the right bank of the Oskol River, Russian forces continue their offensive and have reached the village of Zavody, where fierce fighting continues. Also, Russian troops are trying to break through the defense of the AFU near the village of Vernopolye, so far without significant success. Barvenkovo, which is an important logistics route for supplying the Armed Forces in the Donbas, is under heavy fire of Russian artillery. There is no progress in the direction of Barvenkovo yet.
In the direction of Slavyansk, the troops approached the Red Lyman. The AFU grouping deployed in the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk region are under heavy fire. So far, no new attempts of LPR forces to break through the AFU defence in Severodonetsk have been reported. According to some reports , the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is considering the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Severodonetsk to Lisichansk in order to avoid the fragmentation of the grouping.

Heavy shelling on the positions of the AFU in the village of Zarechnoye continues. It is aimed to stop the shelling on civilian areas in the LPR. Ukrainian artillery located there is shelling Gorskoye, Lisichansk, Zarechnoye and Severodonetsk. No ground attack has been reported yet.
The village of Lozovoe in the north of the LPR was reportedly taken under the LPR control.

A small advance of the LPR in Popasnaya. There are reports that the village of Novotoshkovsky is close to fall under the LPR control.
On April 23, during the fighting for the territory of the railway station in Popasnaya, the border guards, as well as a serviceman of the 24th separate mechanized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, a tactical unit of the Ukrainian ground forces, were taken hostage. Loads of weapons were also taken by LPR forces in the area.
War In Ukraine Day 59: Positional Battles On Front Lines And Missile Rain Over Ukraine
captured British AT105 “Saxon”
The AFU continue the counter attacks in the Kharkiv region, near the capital of the region. On April 22, Ukrainian forces attacked the positions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at Cossack Lopan. Forces of up to one motorized infantry battalion took part in the attack. As a result, the attack was thwarted and at least 2 tanks and 8 infantry fighting vehicles were reportedly destroyed.
The AFU claimed control of Bezruky, Slatyne, Prudianka north of Kharkiv city. However, the area was considered as a gray zone with no battles but intense shelling, thus the claims are yet to be confirmed.
On April 23, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) carried out another attack on the Russian territory. The checkpoint in the village of Tetkino in the Russian Kursk region was shelled again with mortars by Ukrainian forces deployed in the Sumy region. No casualties were reported, but the attack resulted in some material damage to civilian facilities.

In the DPR, no significant changes were reported on the front lines. The main hotspots are the areas near Avdiivka, where fighting continues in the area of Novobakhmutovka, Novoselka-2 and Troitsky, and near Maryinka.
On the southern front lines in the Donbass region, Russian forces continue heavy artillery shelling on the front lines from Malinovka to Kamenskoye. Positional battles continue along the entire line of contact on this front.

On the Novomikhailovka—Ugledar—Velikaya Novoselka front line, the AFU are holding their positions.
No changes were reported on the Kamenskoye—Orekhov—Gulyai-Pole front line in the Zaporizhya region.

In the south of Ukraine, fighting continues on the border of the Nikolaev and Kherson regions. The AFU attempt to advance from the area of Novorontsovka, but without any significant success so far. In the Kherson region, Russian forces attempted an attack on the village of Trudolyubovka, but no advances were confirmed.
The Odessa region is preparing to become another hotspot of the war. The AFU are accumulating forces for the defense of the city and provide the supply of weapons from Romania and fuel from Moldova to the troops in the Mykolaiv and Krivoy Rog directions.
On April 23, President of Ukraine Zelenskiy claimed that Odessa may become “another Mariupol” soon.
On April 23, at least six Russian missiles hit the Ukrainian region of Odessa. Missile strikes targeted AFU military infrastructure facilities. Russian servicemen struck a military airfield near Odessa. According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, a large batch of weapons from the United States and the EU was destroyed.

However, at least one multi-storey civilian building was hit. 6 people were reportedly killed. Judging by the footage, most likely the destruction of the civilian house was caused by the debris of the missile that was intercepted over the city by the air defence systems deployed at the airfield. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported that two missiles were shot down by air defense means in the sky over Odessa. One was intercepted directly above the city, the other one was shot down in Karolino-Bugaz.
At night, the workshops of an enterprise producing explosives and gunpowder for the Ukrainian armed forces were destroyed by high-precision ground-based missiles in the Pavlograd area.
According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, on April 23 and at night on April 24, nine military facilities of Ukraine were hit by high-precision air-based missiles of the Russian Aerospace Forces, including one control point of the AFU brigade, four strong points and places of concentration of manpower and military equipment, as well as four warehouses of rocket and artillery weapons in the districts of Barvenkovo, Novaya Dmitrovka and Ivanovka in the Kharkiv region.
The Russian Aerospace Forces hit 26 military facilities of Ukraine. Among them, the battalion’s command and observation post, as well as 25 areas of concentration of manpower and Ukrainian military equipment were destroyed. Up to 150 nationalists and up to 40 armored vehicles and vehicles were destroyed.

Rocket troops and artillery performed 423 fire missions at night. As a result of the strikes, 26 control points, 367 strong points and areas of accumulation of manpower and military equipment, as well as 25 positions of artillery batteries were hit. 4 warehouses of rocket and artillery weapons and ammunition were destroyed in the areas of Gusarovka and Velikaya Kamishevakha.
10 Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles were destroyed by Russian air defense means in the areas of the settlements of Barvinok, Vasilevka, Krasnogorovka, Kremennaya, Novy Pervomaisk, Poltava, Tomarino, Fedorovka, Yasinovatoye, according to the Russian Ministry of Defence.
 
I read that it will be forbiden in Europe because of too much CO2...

That's a bummer. Well, at least we still have Yugo.


Zastava-Koral-Serbia-2007.jpg
 
Meanwhile in Germany.

Famously debt-averse Germany has decided that it will need to borrow nearly 40 billion euros ($43 billion) to cushion its economy from the blowback caused by the war in Ukraine.
They plan to use the money to blunt the economic and financial impact of the war (ie on more handouts for the country's citizens), which has led to surging energy prices that must be shouldered by German companies and consumers, according to Bloomberg, who cited several sources close to the German government.




Once finalized, the proposal from Finance Minister Christian Lindner will then be sent to the Bundestag, Germany's parliament, for approval.

Since the start of the coronavirus pandemic, the German government has ended its longstanding opposition to debt and unleashed an unprecedented borrowing binge, with net new debt of €130 billion euros in 2020 and a record €215 billion euros in 2021.



Source: Bloomberg

The ruling coalition has suspended constitutional limits on new borrowing for three consecutive years to deal with the economic fallout from the pandemic.

In addition to this latest tranche of money, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has also announced a special fund worth €100 billion to pay for a massive increase in Germany's military spending, which will also help it meet NATO's military spending goal of 2% of economic output per year. Lindner has said that borrowing to finance the fund will be spread over several years, which means borrowing for 2022 will likely exceed €140 billion, depending on how much money from the fund will be attributed to this fiscal year.



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Gerhard Schröder, who is paid almost $1 million a year by Russian-controlled energy companies, has become a pariah. But he is also a symbol of Germany’s Russia policy.
 
Canadian media reports that the "former" commander of the army, Lieutenant General Trevor Cadier, is in Ukraine, and he has been absent since February. It is speculated that he may be surrounded in #Azovstal

Indeed, his presence at Azovstal is speculated. It is possible he's there, but it's also likely that the ua Nazis suggested it in order to protect themselves from being bombed (which wouldn't happen anyway) or to spin another story in case it can be used against Russia (and in their wet dream get the Canadian military directly involved?). He is a kinda big guy, was to have taken over command of the Canadian army last September, but an investigation into his alleged past sexual misconduct got in the way. Let's have a quick look at his bio:

.https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/transition-materials/defence-101/2020/03/defence-101/sjs.html

March 2020 - Strategic Joint Staff - Major General Trevor Cadieu
Archived content
This page was proactively published to meet the requirements of the Access to Information Act. It is a historical record which was valid when published, but may now contain information which is out of date.

Biography
Appointed Director of Staff (DOS) 24 June 2019
28 years in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) with Operational tours to Bosnia-Herzegovina [1998], Afghanistan [2002, 2006-2007] and Israel [2017, Operation Proteus].
Commanded at all levels of the organization

Mandate
Provide situational awareness, military analysis and decision support to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)
Conduct strategic level engagement with other government departments, allies, and partner nations
Conduct strategic analysis to achieve military strategic effects
Develop and distribute CDS directives and orders
Plan and support Force Posture and Readiness
Synchronize CAF strategic sustainment and support
Arms control verification
Integrate Gender Based Analysis Plus into CAF policies and operations.

I guess he's working there on gender analysis within ua Nazi ranks. :whistle:

Anyway, being under investigation , he suddenly retired on April 5 after more than 30 years in military service and headed to Ukraine to help defend the country from Russia’s invasion.

Apr 21, 2022
Trevor Cadieu left the Canadian military on April 5, according to the Department of National Defence. He travelled to Ukraine shortly after with the intention to volunteer for that country’s military which is battling a Russian invasion, multiple defence sources confirmed to this newspaper.

The Canadian Forces National Investigation Service which is investigating Cadieu originally had difficulty contacting the retired lieutenant-general but has since established communication with him.

Mr. Cadieu, who has previously denied any wrongdoing, could not be reached for comment on Thursday while the Defence Department declined to confirm his whereabouts.

“As he is now a private citizen, it would be inappropriate for us to comment further on his personal plans,” Mr. Le Bouthillier said.
How convenient...
 

KIEV FORCES ARE COMPLAINING ABOUT THE POOR QUALITY OF UK-SUPPLIED ANTI-TANK MISSILES (VIDEO)​

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Kiev Forces Are Complaining About The Poor Quality Of UK-Supplied Anti-Tank Missiles (Video)
File image.
Kiev forces have been reportedly complaining about the poor quality of the NLAW anti-tank missiles supplied by the UK.
Most of the complains were about the system’s battery which is used to power the launch process. The batteries are reportedly either dead, running out of power too fast or not functioning well in the cold weather.
On April 24, Ukrainian sources shared a video showing a government fighters hot-wiring a NLAW missile launcher to a 12-volt motorcycle battery to power it up. This technique is unreliable, unpractical and unsafe.

The NLAW, which is manufactured by Sweden’s Saab Bofors Dynamics and the UK-based Thales Air Defence, is guided by PLOS [predicted line of sight] with fire-and-forget capability. The missile has a range of 1,000 meters only and can penetrate more than 500 mm of rolled homogeneous armour. It can be preprogramed to attack its target directly or from the top.
The UK has supplied Kiev forces with more than 4,000 NLAW missiles, so far. More missiles of this type are reportedly being shipped to Ukraine.
Many of the NLAW missiles supplied by the UK have been already captured by the Russian military and the armed forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR). The captured missile systems are being used by DPR and LPR troops.
The UK has been leading Western efforts to support the Kiev regime side by side with the US. Britain believes that Western military support will lead to the failure of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine. However, military support for Kiev is only prolonging the war and hindering peace talks.
 

WAR IN UKRAINE DAY 60: OVERVIEW OF MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN DONBASS (18+)​

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War In Ukraine Day 60: Overview Of Military Developments In Donbass (18+)
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On April 24, the main developments in Ukraine took place in the Izyum area, where fierce clashes continue.
Russian forces are advancing in the area of Barabashevka and Vernopolya. Another tactical success of the Russian army was reported near the village of Kurulka which is located 5 km from the key highway Barvenkovo—Slavyansk. Russian forces pushed the AFU out of the village and took control of a stronghold near the settlement. The road nearby is used by the AFU for the ammunition, fuel, food supplies. The village of Dubravnoye has also previously came under the Russian control.
To the east of the Oskol River, the Russian control of Lozovoye, Redkodub and Torsky has been confirmed. Battles are taking place along the Alexandrovka — Zelenaya Dolina — Zarechnoye front line. Fighting reached the area of Dolgenky.
In the Kharkiv region, the front lines follow Prudyanka — Russian Lozovaya — Tsirkuny — Shestakovka — Primorskoe — Novaya Gnilitsa — Balakleya villages. No changes were reported despite the AFU attempts to counter attack towards the Russian Lozova and from the town of Chuguev.
War In Ukraine Day 60: Overview Of Military Developments In Donbass (18+)
Russian multiple launch rocket system “Smerch” in action
In the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk region, fighting continues on the outskirts of the city of Severodonetsk, and LPR troops continue the mop up operation on the outskirts of Rubezhnoe. No more assault attempts of the LPR on Severodonetsk were reported in the recent days.
To the north-east of Zolotoe, LPR forces claimed control over the village of Novotoshkovskoye.
Capture by the Russian army of the AFU stronghold near the city of Kremennaya:

Heavy clashes continue in Popasnaya. The LPR units are slowly advancing, On April 24, the LPR control over the Popasnaya-1 railway station was confirmed.
In the areas near Avdeevka and Maryinka, no changes on the front lines were reported as well. Artillery battles continue in the region.

On April 24, the AFU fired 197 shells and mines from 122-mm BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 152 and 122-mm barrel artillery, 120 and 82-mm mortars. Areas of 8 settlements came under fire, as a result of which 3 civilians were injured. 12 residential buildings, 4 objects of civil infrastructure and 7 vehicles were damaged.
According to the DPR military officials, the DPR servicemen destroyed 26 Ukrainian nationalists, 1 firing position of 122-mm D-30 howitzers and 2 infantry fighting vehicles on April 24. 1 armored personnel carrier, 1 ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft gun and 1 cargo vehicle were captured.
War In Ukraine Day 60: Overview Of Military Developments In Donbass (18+)
17 servicemen of the 36th Marine brigade surrendered in Malinovka.
On the southern front lines, Ukrainian sources reported the advance of the Russian army by 10 km in the area between Gulyai-Pole and Velikaya Novoselka. The AFU are in control over the town of Gulyai-Pole, as well as the villages of Temirovka and Velikaya Novoselka.
In the city of Mariupol, the shelling on the Azovstal plant continues, while the assault on the facility was stopped.
On April 24, the Ukrainian shell hit the area near the village of Otradnaya in the Russian Belgorod region. No casualties or damage were reported as a result of the attack.
War In Ukraine Day 60: Overview Of Military Developments In Donbass (18+)
Click to see full-size image

Russian missile strikes on the Ukrainian military facilities continue.
On April 24, the authorities of the Poltava region reported that nine missiles hit a certain object on the outskirts of the city of Kremenchuk. Presumably, the target of the strike was an oil refinery which is the main enterprise of the oil refining industry left in Ukraine. The facility was already targeted by Russian missiles.
UAF positions were hit in Kramatorsk. The strikes were also reported in the town of Druzhkovka, where the nationalist unit “Dnepr-1”, officially part of the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, was based.
Positions of the mortar unit of the 93rd mechanized brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces “Kholodny Yar” were reportedly destroyed in the Donetsk region.

Adviser to the head of the Ukrainian Presidential Administration Arestovich said that US Secretary of State Blinken and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin are currently in Kiev negotiating with Zelensky. Zelensky announced their arrival at his press conference on April 23. The US State Department claimed that they had nothing to report about the possibility of a visit.
 
How many years have I been observing this strange expansionist message, they say, Russian-speaking = pro-Russian / Russian. Language is far from being the main instrument of self-identification; the key here is that Ukraine is a mono-ethnic state, i.e. those who identify themselves as Russians make up less than a quarter of the population. An example of the concept of the "triune Russian people"

A strange statement to say the least. I, not in the order of a dispute with the author, just for the breadth of view on the problem, I will point out the obvious "oddities" and give a few other facts on this topic.
The first oddity is that the statement: "How many years have I ...", explained by data from 2014, 2019. Even without looking at the reliability of the source of information, looking at one time interval, in my opinion it is not serious.
The second oddity is "this strange expansionist message". What is expansionism? Here, in my opinion, there is some porridge.
The third oddity is that I see almost "Poroshenkov" terms like: "mono-ethnic state".
Below I will give excerpts from an article by a professional specialist that will allow us to take a different look at both the number of Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine, as well as at "mono-ethnicity" and "Ukrainism" itself.

Where did the Russians disappear, or "communicating vessels" of ethnolanguage self-identification: Ukraine, 1989– 2001

Author: Efimov S. A.
Journal: History and modernity. Issue No.1/2009

The 2001 Census recorded a widespread increase in the specific indicators of the number of Ukrainians in all regions (see column 5). The only exception was Crimea due to its mission as the main migrant–accepting region of Ukraine: large-scale repatriation of Crimean Tatars contributed to the fact that during the period between censuses their absolute number on the peninsula increased 6.4 times (from 38.4 thousand people to 245.3 thousand people), and relative - from 1.6% to 12.1%. It should be noted that this circumstance must be constantly taken into account in order to understand other general Crimean processes.

An important result of the 2001 census is the fact of both absolute and relative decline in the number of Russians in Ukraine. This is typical for all regions of the state.

The number of Russians in the Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv regions has more than halved. Their number decreased by 40% or more in Vinnytsia, Volyn, Zhytomyr, Kirovograd, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytsky regions, by more than a third – in Kiev, Transcarpathian, Kiev, Poltava, Sumy, Kherson, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi regions. At the same time, only in two regions – in the Ternopil and Sumy regions – specific indicators (see column 5) the decrease in the Russian population exceeds the corresponding indicators of the growth of the number of Ukrainians (in the Cherkasy region they are equal). In other regions, as in Ukraine as a whole, the specific indicators of the growth of the number of Ukrainians slightly exceed the corresponding indicators of the decline in the number of Russians.

Russian Russians, who most likely come from mixed Ukrainian-Russian families, have made the main contribution to the decrease in the number of Russians, not migration, but a change in the ethnic identity of Russians. This is confirmed by the data provided by I. M. Pribytkova of the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, according to which the losses of the Russian population in the migration exchange with the countries of the near and far abroad from 1994 to 2000 amounted to 326 thousand. people, as well as data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, indicating that over the past decade about 600 thousand people of all nationalities have moved from Ukraine to the Russian Federation (Pribytkova 2003: 324).
The share of Ukrainians who consider the language of their nationality as their native language increased in 16 regions, in the Poltava region it remained at the same level, and in 9 regions (Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporozhye, Lugansk, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Kharkiv and Kherson regions, as well as in the Crimea) it decreased. At the same time, the proportion of Ukrainians who consider Russian as their native language has almost mirrored in these regions. This can be explained, perhaps, by the fact that the change in ethnic identity from "Russians" to "Ukrainians" was not accompanied by a corresponding change in linguistic identity. "It is easier to declare oneself a Ukrainian during the census than to return the lost language," S. Kulchitsky comments on this circumstance (Kulchitsky 2003). We also point out that the decline in the relative number of people who consider Ukrainian as their native language is observed in the whole region only in Donetsk (-6.6%), Luhansk (-4.8%) regions and in Crimea (-4.2%). And if in the Crimean case this is a consequence of the large-scale repatriation of the Crimean Tatars, then the explanation of the Donbass phenomena requires additional research. An analysis of migration processes can provide some clue to their understanding (Shulga 2002: 98-101). We should add that, according to L. A. Aza, linguistic self-identification sometimes takes demonstrative forms and that the increase in the proportion of people who prefer the Russian language of communication may occur during periods of increased action of various kinds of political and economic levers (Aza 2001: 530). This conclusion was most vividly illustrated by the 2004 presidential election .

Let us draw the reader's attention to the "effect of communicating vessels" when changing the linguistic identity of Ukrainians and Russians: the volumes of "overflow" practically coincide, not exceeding 0.1–0.2% for the vast majority of regions (and Ukraine as a whole). Quantitative estimates of this phenomenon (the module of the difference of the modules of the corresponding data of increase/decrease from graphs 7 and 9) are given in column 10.
At one time, responding to critics of the 1989 census, the author made a fully confirmed forecast about "a significant increase in the proportion of Ukrainians and people who consider Ukrainian their native language in the total population of Ukraine" according to the results of the upcoming census, linking this primarily with the acquisition of the status of the Ukrainian nation "titular" (Efimov 1997: 16). Six years later, commenting on the results of the 2001 census, L. D. Kuchma noted that "a person is looking for his own benefit, trying to adapt to new circumstances, to catch what the authorities like… People have stopped being afraid to declare themselves Ukrainians..." (Kuchma 2003: 298). Let's add to the above that L. Kuchma himself changed his ethnic identity from "Russian" to "Ukrainian" after Ukraine gained independence. A few decades earlier, a different process was observed: L. Brezhnev, for example, at a certain stage turned from a "Ukrainian" into a "Russian".

In conclusion, we add that no one has yet managed to subject the census procedures to any reasonable criticism in terms of obtaining ethno-linguistic statistics. An affirmative answer can also be given to the question of the comparability of the final results of the censuses of 1989 and 2001 .

Куда исчезли русские, или «сообщающиеся сосуды» этноязыковой самоидентификации: Украина, 1989– 2001 гг.

The fourth oddity

i.e. those who identify themselves as Russians make up less than a quarter of the population.

It is clear that this will not prevent Russia from taking these territories for itself (all the more so for a long time there were behind-the-scenes rumors about this on many telegram channels that Russia put an ultimatum to Zelensky in the form of surrender with the loss of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, if they refuse, the south of Ukraine will also be lost) we remember that most people are a mechanical, amorphous mass in Ukraine is still a very apolitical mass, so even if these people are Ukrainians (and they are the majority in all regions except Crimea and Donbass), they will not resist

It seems to me that "less than a quarter of the population" is, to put it mildly, very, very much. And if we take into account the trends mentioned in the above excerpts of the article, and take into account the events that took place in Ukraine after 2013, then anyone who still identifies himself as a Russian is almost a hero. And their quarter of the population!
Let me remind you of the words of L.D. Kuchma, said in 2003: "a person is looking for his own benefit, trying to adapt to new circumstances, to catch what the authorities like ... People have stopped being afraid to declare themselves Ukrainians..." 10-11 years after the above, it would be necessary to add: "people have become afraid to declare themselves as Russian."
Another important conclusion. As in the 90s, many people, following political trends, changed their identity from Russian to Ukrainian, and now, under certain circumstances, they will change in the opposite direction. Circumstances, meanwhile, to my deep regret, contribute to this.
First of all, the deplorable state of Ukraine itself. I must say that the mentioned 2001 population census was the last in history. The country has not conducted a census for more than 20 years, although it is one of the main tools in development planning. Why would that be? Because it's scary to look at the numbers yourself, and even more so it's impossible to show the world. Depopulation is terrible. According to various estimates, the population decline is about 20%, and together with recent events, then all 25%. In natural numbers, this is more than 10 million people. What kind of development can we talk about?
Further. As a result of Russia's military operation, Ukraine will not remain the same, this is clear. It is impossible to say what the new look of this territory will be yet, but what has already happened in Mariupol, Volnovakha, Izyum, and a number of other localities, and that something like this, quite possibly, will still happen during the special operation, with a high degree of probability, will make people shy away from trident and any other "Ukrainishness" like the devil from incense.


По меньшей мере странное заявление. Я, не в порядке спора с автором, просто для широты взгляда на проблему, укажу на очевидные "странности" и приведу несколько другие факты по указанной теме.
Первая странность это то, что заявление: " я столько лет...", поясняется данными от 2014, 2019 годов. Даже не глядя на достоверность источника информации, глядя на один временной промежуток, на мой взгляд это несерьезно.
Вторая странность это "this strange expansionist message". В чем заключается экспансионизм? Тут, на мой взгляд, присутствует некоторая каша.
Третья странность заключается в том, что я вижу практически "порошенковские" термины типа: "моноэтничное государство".
Ниже я приведу выдержки из статьи профессионального специалиста, которые позволят по другому взглянуть как на количество русских, украинцев на Украине, так и на "моноэтничность" и на само "украинство".
Четвертая странность
Мне кажется, что "менее чем четверть населения" это, мягко говоря очень-очень много. А если учесть те тенденции, о которых говорилось в вышеприведенных отрывках статьи, и учесть события произошедшие на Украине после 2013 года, то любой, кто по прежнему идентифицирует себя как русского- почти герой. А их четверть населения!

Напомню слова Л.Д. Кучмы, сказанные в 2003 году: "a person is looking for his own benefit, trying to adapt to new circumstances, to catch what the authorities like… People have stopped being afraid to declare themselves Ukrainians..." Через 10-11 лет после сказанного нужно было бы добавить :"люди стали бояться заявлять себя как русского".

Еще один важный вывод. Как в 90е множество людей, следуя политическим тенденциям меняли самоидентификацию с русского на украинца, так и сейчас при определенных обстоятельствах поменяют в обратную сторону. Обстоятельства же пока, к моему глубокому сожалению, этому способствуют.
В первую очередь плачевное состояние самой Украины. Надо сказать, что упомянутая перепись населения 2001 года стала последней в истории. Страна не производит перепись более 20 лет, хотя это один из основных инструментов при планировании развития. Почему бы это? Потому что на цифры самим смотреть страшно и тем более показывать миру невозможно. Депопуляция страшная. По разным оценкам снижение численности населения около 20%, а вместе с последними событиями, то и все 25%. В натуральных цифрах это больше 10 миллионов человек. О каком развитии может идти речь?
Далее. В результате военной операции России Украина не останется в прежнем виде, это ясно. Каким будет новый вид этой территории пока сказать нельзя, но то что случилось уже в Мариуполе, Волновахе, Изюме, ряде других населенных пунктов и что подобное, вполне возможно, еще произойдет в процессе проведения спецоперации с большой долей вероятности заставит людей шарахаться от тризуба и любой другой "украинскости" как черт от ладана.
 
The donkey's ears did come out. Well, nothing, we have already been warned that this is not all. New productions are already being prepared.

In the West, a sensational statement was made about the death of civilians in Bucha (PHOTO)
25.04.2022 - 0:30

The results of the forensic medical examination of the bodies found in Irpen and Bucha have been published, the British edition of The Guardian reports.

Judging by them, those people who were examined by experts were killed not by bullets, but by striking elements of anti-personnel shells. That is, they were killed during the shelling.

The publication writes that small metal darts, called flechettes, were found in the bodies of the victims.

"We found some very thin, nail—like objects in the bodies of men and women," Ukrainian forensic scientist Vladislav Perovsky told the Guardian. According to him, most of these bodies are from the Bucha-Irpensky district.

The flechette is an anti—personnel weapon that was widely used during the First World War. Currently, a variety of flechettes are used as ready-made striking elements in the shells of tanks or field guns. They are not prohibited by conventions, but their use in cities is a violation of humanitarian law.

The publication blames the Russian artillery for what happened, but it is obvious that the Russian artillery has nothing to do with it.

Photography experts have determined that such "darts" are used in the 122-millimeter ZSH-1 projectile.This projectile fits the D-30 and 2S1 howitzers, which are widely used by Ukrainian troops. Ammunition with such a filling has been used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the conflict since 2014.

It is also worth noting that the shelling of the Bucha occupied by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was conducted by the APU.

"If honest journalists read us, then pay attention — this Guardian material is very important.

Because for any serious Western politician, the words in it about "Russian artillery" are an explicable politeness. And the fact that the whole world was openly fooled with the "genocide in Bucha" is now obvious.

Even if it really was Russian artillery (which is actually almost unbelievable)," the authors of the Telegram channel "Major and General" associated with the security forces write.

https://rusvesna.su/news/1650833450
 
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